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In 1998, the world first became aware of the huge impact that landmines were 
having upon humanity when the former Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan 
and the world saw how much damage landmines were having on the 
population. 
This study sets out to assess how the global community has set about dealing 
with this blight.  The United Nations has played a leading role in the formation 
of programmes to attempt to ameliorate the situation.  Whilst many of these 
programmes have removed a significant number of mines and undoubtedly 
saved thousands from death and injury, progress has generally been slow and 
there is a perception that the process of programme initiation is far from 
perfect.  Whilst this may be a fair criticism, the method of programme 
development tries to be focussed on capacity development as well as the 
clearance and reduction of casualties, which in itself may cause difficulties in 
the initiation.   
The study analyses the development of two programmes in particular – the 
national programmes in Cambodia and Mozambique – and then considers the 
influences that culture and organisational structure have had upon those 
organisations. 
Taking these lessons, the study moves to analyse how the best methods of 
implementation could be implemented and recommends a number of areas to 
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On the 3rd December 1997, a remarkable treaty was signed by 122 nations in 
Ottawa. The treaty was hailed by United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi 
Annan as “a landmark step in the history of disarmament” and “a historic victory 
for the weak and vulnerable of our world”.iii  The Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and On 
{sic} Their Destruction1 was developed and negotiated within a 12 month period 
and was acknowledged by most to be a remarkable achievementiii.  Since the 
initiation, some 140 countries have signed or acceded to the treaty, of whom, 
118 have ratified, therefore fully committing themselves to all the provisions of 
the Anti – Personnel Mine Ban Treaty.iv   
 
The treaty essentially prevents all signatories from using, holding, producing 
and transferring all anti – personnel (AP) landmines.  It also commits them to 
destroying any stockpiles they may hold and to clearing all AP mines on their 
territory within a 10-year period of ratification.  It is evident that the treaty is 
making a significant difference.  As the Landmine Monitor states:  “A growing 
number of governments are joining the Mine Ban Treaty, and {…} there is a 
decreased use of antipersonnel landmines, a dramatic drop in production, an 
almost complete halt to trade, rapid destruction of stockpiled mines, fewer mine 
victims in key affected countries, and more land demined.”v 
 
Whilst the political movements in the anti-landmine2 arena have moved on a 
pace, so the concept of clearance and land remediation has also altered in a 
significant way. In the last 10 years, the mine clearance industry has 
transformed itself from a tough “cowboy” industry, employing “roughnecks” who 
would have difficulty finding work outside the sector, to a regulated industry 
working to international standards and attempting to achieve the most effective 
methods of clearance offering value for money, safety and reliability.  Although 
                                                          
1 Throughout this report, the convention will be known by its common name, the “AP Mine Ban Treaty” 
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the AP Mine Ban Treaty does not address it, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) 
presents an equal threat in socio – economic terms in many countries and must 
also be cleared.  Throughout this study, the term “mines” refers to both mines 
and UXO. 
 
The general public became aware of the humanitarian problems relating to 
landmines in 1989 following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.  During the 
10-year conflict both sides had laid mines – the Mujahadeen to block enemy 
deployments and to support ambushes and the Soviets in protective and terror 
based tactics.  In the very early days of the problem (the early 1990’s), mines 
were estimated to be causing between 20 and 25 casualties per day in 
Afghanistanvi. This was reduced in mid 2001 to an estimated mere 10-12 
casualties per day.  Figures since 11th September 2001, when around 4,000 
Afghan UN deminers were withdrawn from Afghanistan during the campaign, 
are still somewhat sketchy. 
 
In the late 1980s, a number of organisations attempted to ameliorate the 
emerging mine problem in Afghanistan although in the aftermath of the Soviet 
withdrawal, the situation proved to be frenzied and uncoordinated. The UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) established its first 
coordination centre in Afghanistan in 1990 in order to attempt to bring some 
order to the chaos.  By the end of September 1990, 432 trained deminers were 
organised and working in 16 teams throughout Afghanistanvii.   
 
Afghanistan is just one more example of how a great number of actors pulled 
together in demanding circumstances requiring a better focus on coordination.  
Afghanistan is not considered in detail in this study but is yet another example 
of why it is important to focus Mine Action research in this direction. 
Aim 
The aim of this study is to make recommendations for the better implementation 
of a national mine action centre (MAC). 
                                                                                                                                                                          





The objectives of the study are: 
 
• To outline the global landmine problem. 
• To describe the structure of the current state of the mine clearance industry 
and analyse the modus operandi for the development of a MAC. 
• To examine the limitations and problems associated with the current method 
of MAC development in order to define the best way of improving it. 
• To examine the cultural influences that affect the development of a Mine 
Action Programme. 
• To assess whether a standardised methodology for implementing a MAC 
would be of benefit. 
 
The scope of this study will be bounded by extant limitations.  All mine action 
activities will be assumed to be humanitarian mine action activities. There are 
many definitions of humanitarian mine action, but in this case, it is proposed to 
accept the UNs’ definition of mine action as referring to:   
 
‘those activities geared towards addressing the problems faced by 
populations as a result of landmine contamination.  It is not so much about 
mines as it is about people and their interactions with a mine-infested 
environment.  Its aim is not technical – to survey, mark and eradicate 
landmines – but humanitarian and developmental – to recreate an 
environment in which people can live safely, in which economic, social and 
health development can occur freely from the constraints imposed by 
landmine contamination, and which the victim’s needs are addressed.’ viii  
 
Mine Action is considered to contain the following five elements: 
• “Mine clearance, including survey, mapping, and marking; 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Contamination and Booby traps. 
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• Mine awareness and risk reduction education; 
• Victim assistance; 
• Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines 
• Advocacy to stigmatise the use of landmines and support a total ban on 
antipersonnel landmines”“ix 
 
It is also worth noting at this stage the UN’s vision as stated in the Strategy 
paper for 2001-5 
 
“We envision a world free of the threat of landmines and unexploded 
ordnance, where individuals and communities live in a safe environment 
conducive to development, and where mine survivors are fully integrated 
into their societies.”x 
 
 At the moment the UN supports the majority of MACs around the world. The 
majority are also funded to a greater extent, through the UN, rather than the 
host Government, which has a significant influence on the host nation’s desire 
to direct the programme. 
Study value 
At the moment, the development of a MAC to a country is done on an almost ad 
hoc basis, with a host nation asking the UN for support to overcome a 
humanitarian problem.  The UN will not move without this invitation.  Thus far, 
the method for structuring and developing a MAC has not been completely 
standardised and there are strong arguments that there should not be such a 
protocol due to the widely differing cultural influences – what works in South 
East Asia may well not work particularly well in Africa.  It is one of the objectives 
of this study to assess whether such a protocol could prove valuable. 
 
With a standardised methodology, it does however seem probable that 
efficiencies could be introduced into the process of design and implementation 
of a MAC which would reflect well on the humanitarian community by improving 
the value for money spent on mine action activities in a mine affected country. 
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Origins of the study 
The author of the study spent a number of years in the field as a Technical 
Advisor, Programme Manager, and later Senior Technical Advisor in mine 
action programmes between the years of 1994 and 1999.  During his time in the 
field, he became increasingly frustrated at the problems caused by weak 
management of the programmes by national staff, poor expatriate advice 
offered to those programmes, restricted tied aid and structural difficulties within 
national programmes.  Much has improved since those formative years, but the 
author feels that there is still scope for further more structured improvement.  
Methodology
The study will draw on three culturally different countries, and their mine action 
structures, all set up under very different circumstances, but with almost 
identical aims of ridding their home nations of landmines.  The two countries to 
be analysed in detail will be Cambodia and Mozambique; the third, Lebanon, 
will be outlined initially together with Cambodia and Mozambique and then a 
detailed analysis will be made in a later chapter.  Whilst these three mine 
affected countries are not the only ones with programmes, given the history that 
has affected the development of these programmes, they can be considered to 
be representative of the majority of extant MACs.  Both the Cambodia and 
Mozambique programmes originated during large UN operations immediately 
post conflict and were planned, developed and implemented in a great hurry.  
Lebanon will be considered in more detail later in the study to assess whether 
previous lessons had been learned.  Lebanon is not completely unique and 
whilst a number of more recent programmes have had the benefit of a greater 
time scale, there are still a large number of programmes, such as the recently 
initiated UN programme in Sri Lanka and the recent UN clearance programme 
in Kosovo that were all implemented at relatively short notice. 
 
Lessons learned will be drawn from these developments and these will then be 
compared with a number of classic organisational models.  The author has 
carried out much of the research over recent months in his work in 
Mozambique, Cambodia and Lebanon and has closely worked with a number of 
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organisations within these countries.  A number of interviews with key 
stakeholders were undertaken either by telephone or during the course of visits 
to these countries.  It is worth noting that because of the relative newness of 
Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), there is a paucity of quality literature in the 
subject area. 
 
Whilst interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, there was a 
requirement to retain some flexibility in order to allow the study to move forward 
in the most beneficial direction.  Because of the author’s position in the industry, 
he was able to access significant data, on both a formal and informal level. 
Case Study analysis 
During the development of the country studies, a general framework was 
developed to give structure to the analysis.  A background section gives the 
historical and political reasons for the environment the countries find 
themselves in.  Following this, a contemporary analysis will assess the 
development of the current mine action environment identifying a number of 
critical characteristics to highlight unique requirements and will then identify any 
key issues arising. 
 
Study Structure 
The detailed structure of the study is outlined below: 
 
• Chapter 1 – Introduction. 
• Chapter 2 – Background to the Global Landmines Situation. 
• Chapter 3 – Literature review.  A general review of the available literature 
available covering both the mine action sector and Mine Action 
Organisational development. 
• Chapter 4 – Detailed analyses of two countries, drawing on the 
successes and failures of both and background to Lebanon, a more 
recent programme. 




• Chapter 6 – Structural implementation. 
• Chapter 7 – Lessons learned in Lebanon. 
• Chapter 8 – Recommendations and Conclusions. 
 
 
                                                          
i  
ii UN Secretary - General Kofi Annan, Address to the signing Ceremony of the Antipersonnel Mines 
Convention. Ottawa, Canada, 3rd December 1997. 
iii The full text of the AP Mine Ban Treaty can be found at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2001 
iv Landmine Monitor Report 2001, (Human Rights Watch, August 2001) 
v op cit, p 1. 
vi Roberts S & Williams J, After the Guns fall Silent, (Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 1995), 
p14. 
vii UNOCHA Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan Workplan 2001 
viii UNMAS paper, Mine action and effective coordination: The United Nations Policy, (A/53/496), 1998 
ix op cit, annex II, para 7 
x UN paper, United Nations Mine Action: A Strategy for 2001-5, Report of the Secretary General, 56th 





Although there is some debate as to when landmines were first used, the 
general history can be traced with reasonable certainty.  Modern landmines are 
explosive traps, but their lineage derives from non-explosive predecessors such 
as spikes and stakes used by ancient armies as far back as 2,500 years ago. 
One of these devices, the four-spiked caltrop can be closely compared to the 
present day landmine in a tactical defensive context and design function. It 
comprises four spikes, usually made of iron, joined at the centre and arranged 
so that when thrown on the ground, one spike always points upwards with the 
other three forming the base. Caltrops were reported to have been used as far 
back as the 3rd century BC, and the same design is still being used in present 
day conflicts. 
  
Explosives were introduced at a later stage to make use of their inherent 
properties in order to improve the killing or wounding capabilities of mines.  It is 
worth noting that mines are generally designed to maim, rather than to kill and 
so increase the physiological effects upon the troops affected. 
 
The earliest explosive-based mines were used in Southern Italy in the 14th 
Century, although these were initiated by a powder trail, which was inherently 
problematic.  In addition, the gunpowder was hygroscopic and therefore could 
be rendered inert after just a few days, depending upon the weather. 
 
The first pressure initiated landmine was recorded in 1726 by the German 
military historian, H Frieherr von Flemming who described what a fladdermine 
(flying mine) looked like:  “It consisted of a ceramic container with glass and 
metal fragments embedded in the clay containing 0.90 kilos of gunpowder, 
buried at a shallow depth in the glacis of a fortress and actuated by someone 




Although noted here in 1726, the concept does not seem to have taken hold 
until the American Civil War, when Brigadier-General Gabriel J. Rains ordered 
his troops to prepare Artillery Shells so they would explode when stepped upon.  
On 4th May 1862, a horseman activated one of these devices and gained the 
epithet of being the first person to be killed by a landmine. 
 
The first use of mines on a large scale was during the First World War, 
designed to outwit the newly deployed tanks.  Further development followed 
and during the Second World War, anti-personnel (AP) mines were specifically 
designed to prevent enemy soldiers from removing the Anti Tank (AT) mines 
that had been employed.  By 1945, the US Army recorded that mines were 
responsible for 2.5% of troop casualties and 20.7% of tank losses.ii 
  
At this stage, mines impacted primarily upon military operations.  In the 1960’s 
however, the problem took a huge leap forward with United States operations 
against the Pathet Lao and in attempts to close the Ho Chi Minh trail in South 
East Asia.  From 1965 to 1970, the US military dropped over 2.5 million tonnes 
of Ordnance over Indochinaiii much of which failed to explode.  A generally 
accepted principle is a 10% dud rate, suggesting that over this period, 250,000 
tonnes of UXO remains over SE Asia.iv  At the same time, forces of both sides 
were laying huge amounts of mines, particularly in Vietnam and the east of 
Cambodia. 
 
The Americans found that the mines and UXO used in South East Asia were a 
double-edged sword.  A recently declassified US intelligence document stated 
that mines and booby traps accounted for 65-70% of US Marine Corps 
casualties in Vietnam during 1965 – and a good proportion of these from their 
own weapons.v 
 
It was during this period of indiscriminate bombing and mining that the 
humanitarian tragedy began to unfold.  Although the explosives dropped along 




and the Pathet Lao, increasingly victims were civilians, and certainly once 
hostilities ceased, the increasing pattern of civilian casualties continued. 
 
From those beginnings, came the makings of the global humanitarian crisis that 
is extant today. There are currently 90 countries affected by Landmines or 
UXO.vi  However, classification of the severity of the problem is not 
straightforward.  For example, the United Kingdom is on the list because of the 
mines laid during the Falklands conflict in 1982.  Although these have caused 
no civilian casualties since the conflict, the classification remains.  In an attempt 
to better understand the scale of the problem, a number of initiatives are 
currently under way.   
 
The ongoing Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) initiative, aims to provide a method 
for assessing the scale of the problem within a country.  In addition, the United 
Nations carries out a number of rapid assessment missions to evaluate the 
impact and scope of mines in a country and to recommend a suitable response. 
Thus far, some 30 countries have undergone assessments or surveys since 
1997.  Of the 90 affected countries, it would not be unreasonable to suggest 
that in the region of 30 of these countries should be classified as “highly 
impacted”.  Similarly, there are some 13 affected countries that have recorded 
no casualties since 1999, including Costa Rica, Guatemala and the United 
Kingdom.vii 
 
The next question to address is how the global community has dealt with this 
crisis.  The first serious international intervention to deal with the problems of a 
country occurred in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal in 1988.  In the 
early days following the withdrawal, casualties were estimated to be around 20-
25 per day in the countryviii and this equated to a clear humanitarian crisis.  This 
triggered a number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), both Afghan 
and international, to begin setting up programmes to clear mines, using local 





The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) set forth 
upon a plan to train 15,000 Afghans in manual mine clearance.  The plan, with 
hindsight, was crudely thought out due to the lack of knowledge of how deal 
with such an issue, but it remains the first serious attempt to carry out and run a 
humanitarian mine clearance programme. 
 
Today, some 37 affected countries3 have some form of body responsible for the 
coordination of mine action activities.ix  These bodies range from a two man 
government sponsored unit such as has been established in Guinea-Bissau, 
through to the full scale programme currently operating in Afghanistan with a 
headquarters coordinating 12 NGOs fielding over 6,500 deminers.  Annex A 
shows the state of UN supported programmes and the extant state of 
development of those programmes. 
 
The role of the UN in mine action 
The UN states that the purpose of mine action is to recreate a safe environment 
conducive to normal life and developmentx. Mine Action encompasses five 
complementary core components (the “five pillars”):  
 
• Mine awareness and risk reduction education;  
• Mine clearance, including survey, mapping, and marking;  
• Victim assistance;  
• Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel landmines;  
• Advocacy to stigmatise the use of landmines and support a total ban on anti-
personnel landmines.xi 
 
The UN is probably the only viable organisation that can take on the role of 
coordination of the global landmine effort.  From the early days of 1988, when 
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
                                                          
3 Abkhasia, Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, 




(UNOCHA) initiated the Afghan programme, the structure and direction of the 
UN mine action community has changed significantly.  Initially, there was 
minimal knowledge and little idea of how to develop a viable programme.  Since 
then, many lessons have been learned and the structures of the UN mine action 
services have altered to form the basis of the system in place today. 
 
It is important to understand that the United Nations will generally only operate 
within a country if the host Government has invited them to do so.  A recent 
notable exception to this is of course Kosovo, where the UN mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) operated under a General Assembly Resolutionxii allowing them to 
operate as the de facto Government.  UNMIK was able therefore to focus on 
specific operational goals with minimal diversion. Unsurprisingly, the Mine 
Action Coordination centre (MACC) in Kosovo has been recognised as one of 
the most successful, operating, in effect, in a political void.  In addition, the 
MACC had the benefit of being very well resourced relative to the scope of the 
problem. 
 
In other countries, programmes are subject to the guidance of national 
governments and generally aim to build the capacity of the local staff to a level 
at which the (relatively expensive) expatriate staff can withdraw and leave the 
national programme to operate by itself.  Indeed one of the specific objectives of 
the United Nations is to have, by 2005, ‘National and local capacities {are} in 
place to plan, coordinate and implement mine-action programmes’.xiii  Whilst 
this is in itself a commendable ideal, the realities of the situation often result in 
programmes that are stifled by the national government that they were set up to 
support. 
 
Outside the specific mine action sector, the UN has come under some criticism 
over recent years with regards to the competency of their Peace Keeping 
Operations (PKO).  Most recently, the “Brahimi report”, commissioned directly 
by the Secretary-General of the UN, stated that:  “Over the last decade, the 
                                                                                                                                                                          




United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge; and it can do no 
better today.”xiv  The time period mentioned in the report corresponds directly 
with the period of time that mine action programmes have been initiated, often 
as part of these very PKO. 
 
In addition to the complications of host government interventions, the potential 
for difficulties is compounded by the structure of the UN organisations tasked to 
work in the mine action environment.  There are no less than 11 UN 
departments or agencies operating in the sector.  The roles and responsibilities 




The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)  
UNMAS is the focal point for all mine-related activities. It is responsible for 
ensuring a coordinated response to landmine contamination, establishing 
priorities for assessment missions and coordinating the mobilisation of 
resources.  It is also responsible for the preparation and maintenance of 
technical standards, the collection and maintenance of mine related data, 
advocacy in support of a global ban on mines and for the management of the 
Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) which is the central fund to which donors channel 
their funds through the UN system for mine action.  The UNMAS is part of the 
Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO). 
 
The UN Development Programme (UNDP)  
UNDP is the focus for the establishment of national and local capacity and 
addressing the socio-economic consequences of mine contamination.  UNDP 
will normally have the prime responsibility for the development of integrated, 
sustainable mine action programmes where programmes have passed the 
“emergency” stage. 
 





The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)  
UNOPS is a service provider for integrated mine action and capacity building 
programmes.  It implements programmes as appropriate in conjunction with the 
concerned partners (such as UNMAS, UNDP etc,).  UNOPS is the Agency 
responsible for recruitment of international staff of programmes.  In addition, 
UNOPS coordinate and manage a programme in Northern Iraq funded by the 
“Oil for Food” agreement between the UN and the Iraqi Government with a 




Notwithstanding the complications inherent within the structures outlined above, 
there is a general intention that the agencies will work together to form, at the 
request of the host government, an organisation to coordinate mine action 
activities within a particular country. 
 
The first step to be considered is the specific need of a nation, and UNMAS will 
normally plan and implement a multi-discipline assessment mission to analyse 
the problem and to recommend a solution.  The team will be formed from a 
number of different agencies and will look at the situation from all angles.  Once 
again, the UN emphasise that normally they must be requested to assist by the 
host nation, and often, this process can take a long time to come about. 
 
The multi-agency team will make recommendations based upon their combined 
approach and expertise and if it is appropriate, a programme of some form will 
be initiated to overcome extant problems.  All development will generally be 
done in close coordination with the host government.  The exceptions would be 
if there were no host government to work with.  An example of this situation 
would be the deployment of the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) in 





                                                          
i Flemming, cited in Croll M, History of Landmines. (Pen and Sword Books), November 1998. 
ii Croll M, op cit. 
iii Prokosh E, The Technology of Killing, (Zed books, 1995),  p105 
iv Mines Advisory Group, quoted at http://www.calweb.com/~gaia/secretwar/ 
v US Defence Intelligence Agency, Landmine Warfare – Trends and Projections, cited in McGrath R, 
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Much has been written about development in the humanitarian aid sector over 
recent years and there is a wide range of material to draw upon.  The Mine 
Action sector has also been well documented, although because of the relative 
youth of the industry, much of the documentation is not as well developed as it 
might be. 
  
The problems encountered by the United Nations and a number of governments 
in the setting up and development of a number of mine action programmes in 
numerous countries45 are manifold.  In some cases, the development of these 
coordination efforts have been meticulously recorded, in some cases, efforts 
have been ad hoc and there is little solid data to be drawn from the situation. 
 
Aim 
The aim of this chapter is to draw on relevant texts, both primary and 
secondary, as well as interview-based data, in order to focus more clearly on 
the development of national mine action capacities so that a detailed analysis of 
the situation can be undertaken.  The chapter will also consider texts from 
outside the mine action sector that prove to be of benefit to the study. 
 
Methodology and Scope 
The literature review will assess the available publications in the areas of 
general mine action, as well as the strategic planning and organisational areas.  
Mine action literature is not, in general terms, well stocked with quality literature 
although there are a number of noteworthy exceptions 
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With such a short timescale for the development of theory of organisation 
structure in humanitarian mine action (i.e., the 13 years of operations since the 
first humanitarian mine clearance in Afghanistan), and with such a diverse 
catalogue of countries in which programmes are operating, the studies 
undertaken to analyse the structures are limited.  The influences on the 
development of individual countries actions are as varied as the different 
cultural, political and environmental issues might cause them to be. 
 
General background. 
The humanitarian impact of landmines on populations has had such an 
invidious effect on populations that much has been written on the effect of 
landmines from the humanitarian perspective.  Much of the early writing was 
emotionally based and stirred huge political support but ultimately did little to 
develop any clear perspective on the problem.  In 1994, the United States’ 
Department of State issued a reporti that described an extremely gloomy and 
apparently insurmountable problem estimating that there were between 80-110 
million landmines planted around the world.  It estimated that the previous year, 
only 80,000 had been lifted, whilst 2.5 million had been laid.  Although the 
background research was generally valid, in the follow on publicationii, some 4 
years later the numbers were estimated downwards to 60-70 million and the 
report suggested that more mines were coming out of the ground than were 
going in.  The reality is that numbers of mines actually mean very little, and are 
seldom quoted these days – the humanitarian impact is by far the most valuable 
judgmental factor (although of course is far more subjective and therefore more 
open to interpretation). 
 
In terms of this type of background, the researcher’s library has been 
significantly bolstered by the publication of the Landmine Monitoriii.  This 
publication was first produced in 1999 by a group of organisations under the 
umbrella of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) – the 
organisation that acted as the driver for the eventual implementation of the AP 




since then and is now recognised to be the key source of data for any research 
in the mine action arena.  It is meticulously researched and provides a solid 
reference base for any researcher in the mine action arena and as well as 
charting the progress of signatory and non-signatory countries towards the ideal 
of the AP Mine Ban Treaty, provides an excellent snapshot of how each mine 
affected country is progressing in its mine clearance activities.  It charts this 
under a number of sub headings such as: ‘Mine Ban Policy, Use, Landmine 
Problem, Mine Action Activities, Mine Awareness, Casualties and Victim 
Assistance’iv 
 
Rae McGrath’s Resource Bookv gives an excellent insight for the uninitiated to 
the mine action world in defining the terms and general background.  Whilst it 
defines the environment in simplistic terms, it was the first book that clearly 
explained to the layman the complications of the industry. 
 
Finally, there is a tri-annual journal that has become accepted globally as the 
central forum for publication of issues from all angles, in the mine action world.  
James Madison University in Virginia, USA, became involved some six years 
ago in the mine action arena, sponsored by the United States Department of 
State (DoS) to promote coordination between operators and programmes.  
James Madison University produce the “Journal of Mine Action”, published 
since the summer of 1997.  The journal regularly turns out thought provoking 
articles, but the journal is not refereed, partly due to the cultural environment of 
the industry – it seems that, at the moment, it is probably too young to feel 
comfortable within such tight constraints. 
 
Specific programme publications 
Once the general mine action theatre has been outlined and understood, a 
more detailed analysis of the structure of how countries and the UN attend to 
the problem needs to be considered.  There are again here a number of papers 
ranging from the National Programmes unpublished and published reports, 





A seminal piece of work was developed in 1997 by a 3-person team, Bob 
Eaton, Chris Horwood and Norah Niland.  The UN Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs (DHA) commissioned a ‘lessons learned’ study titled “Development of 
Indigenous Mine Action Capacities”vi looking at UN established programmes in 
four of the most severely affected countries in the world – Afghanistan, Angola, 
Cambodia and Mozambique.  The Terms of Reference (TOR) define the overall 
objective of the study to: “…enhance the capacity of all actors involved in the 
planning, development and implementation of mine-action programmes to 
determine the most appropriate and cost-effective means for the initiation and 
development of indigenous capabilities essential for the management and 
sustainability of mine-action programmes.”vii  The study produced a number of 
findings and made recommendations, many of which have shaped the structure 
of mine action today.  In particular, the two case studies on Cambodia and 
Mozambique are of great significance in charting the development of mine 
action in those two countries.viii/ix These reports are still regularly referred to as 
extremely valuable pieces of work, even though the environment has 
significantly changed.  As an example, the TOR for the study required the team 
to: ‘examine the role of DHA {…} in assisting local authorities to define 
programme goals and philosophy’x.  It was perhaps unfortunate that, whilst the 
study was being prepared, the focal point responsibility for landmines was 
transferred from DHA to the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO).  
Whilst these obstacles did cause some problems in the drafting, the core of the 
report and its findings remained valid. 
 
Finally, a paper published by the Swedish Government as an analysis of the 
impact of their contributions to HMAxi is an excellent, up to date report 
considering a number of structural and organisational issues with the specific 
Swedish interventions. This particular report recognises that considerable 
improvements have been made over the last few years, yet also recognises that 





The role of the military 
Military forces have traditionally been responsible for the planning and 
deployment of minefields as well as combat breaching operations (in which it is 
commonly accepted that a certain number of casualties is acceptable).  More 
recently, as a more general position, the military have begun working in Peace-
Keeping Operations (PKO), a part of which may include responsibilities within 
HMA.  Whilst the juxtaposition of the role of the military does not always sit 
comfortably within PKO, the recognition that the military play a strong role in 
supporting PKO is noted.  In a recent report commissioned by the Secretary – 
General of the UN, the team suggested that there is a significant shortfall in 
quality troops and expresses a great deal of concern that nations who are on 
the UNs database for military assets available to the UN for support to PKO.  
The report says that: “…many Member States are saying ‘no’ to deploying 
formed military units to United Nations-led peacekeeping operations, far more 
often than they are saying ‘yes’.”xii  
 
In the field of HMA, few nations are prepared to commit their forces to 
operational demining, preferring instead to fill specialist training and 
coordination roles.  For example, the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) have 
conducted a number of courses for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
technicians from a number of countries – indeed in one recent course, 
technicians from all three entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) were trained 
together.xiii   In terms of coordination, SFOR pride themselves in their 
coordination efforts in the field of demining.  “There are few areas where SFOR, 
along with the Entity Armed Forces (EAF), stand as united as in the field of 
engineering.  They are particularly united in the clearance of mines, utilising 
their combined strength to do so.”xiv 
 
National armed forces also have a significant role to play in the clearance of 
their own territory.  As noted, the EAF in BiH take the lead in clearance under 
the coordination of SFOR & the BiH MAC.  In the United Kingdom, the MOD are 




Islands and on the 17th July 2001, the UK and Argentine Foreign Ministers 
agreed that an Exchange of Notes on a demining feasibility study should take 
place. The study and the subsequent clearance will be funded by the Argentine 
Government.xv  The feasibility study is underway and a contractor has been 
identified but not, as yet, accredited as required by IMAS.  Costs are difficult to 
assess but an Argentinean estimate suggested that around $253 million would 
be required to clear all minefields on the islands.xvi  It is worth noting that 
although the Falklands has many thousands of mines laid throughout the 
islands, there had not been a human casualty since September 1983.  
However, the government of the United Kingdom is a States Party to the AP 
Mine Ban Treaty, which commits them to clearing all AP mines from the 
Falklands by 1 March 2009. 
 
Mine issues 
There are a number of studies and reports to study the structures of mine action 
and the development of mine action in these two countries.  By far the most 
significant is the Development of Indigenous Capacity Study as mentioned 
previously.  In Cambodia, the most significant publication is “War of the 
Mines”xvii which outlines the scope of the mines problem in Cambodia, followed 
by a number of specific programme reports.  In particular, the Cambodian Mine 
Action Centre’s  (CMAC) own publication, “From Emergency to Developmentxviii” 
provides logic for many of the decisions taken during the development of 
CMAC.  Many of these publications recognise that the industry has come a long 
way in a short time and that whilst much has improved, there is still great scope 
for continued improvement.  Another key factor identified by the majority of 
authors on the subject area is the difficulties in making the transition from 
emergency into development. 
 
The development of literature over the last five years (prior to this point, there 
was very little indeed to use in any substantive way, primarily because the 




quality research increased from virtually nil, to a state where there is quality 
literature, if the researcher looks hard enough. 
 
Finally, for Mozambique, there is one key publication.  Laurie Boulden was a 
researcher with the South African Institute of International Affairs in the late 
1990’s and produced a bookxix in which she outlines the political intricacies and 
bureaucratic tangles that hindered clearance efforts in Mozambique in the post 
ONUMOZ years.  The problem in Mozambique, she says, is that “poor national 
coordination, rivalries amongst the various actors and bureaucratic minutiae 
have each hindered efforts…{but that}… However, that projects are under way 
is the most important fact”.  Boulden summarises by stating that “no matter how 
crooked or long the path might be, de-mining in Mozambique has clearly been 
making an impact where it is needed, not in the boardrooms of Maputo or the 
capitals of Europe, but in the fields and villages of the country.” xx 
 
Summary 
Much of the writing has focussed on the analysis of detailed elements of the 
mine action industry since 1990 and recognises that, although there are still 
huge problems in the industry, some mitigation may be allowed for because of 
the development span of the industry.  Many recommendations have been 
made, some of which have been acted on, to the benefit of the community, and 
other recommendations, which may be less acceptable for political or financial 
reasons. 
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Analyses of mine action programmes 
 
Structure 
The development of the two country studies uses a general framework to give 
structure to the analysis.  A background section gives the historical and political 
reasons for the environment in which countries find themselves.  Following this, 
a contemporary analysis assesses the development of the current state of 
affairs and identifies a number of critical variables and key issues arising. 
 
In addition to the detailed analysis of Cambodia and Mozambique, this chapter 
will also provide a more general introduction to a more recent programme in 




On the 4th October 1992, 30 years of fighting in Mozambique drew to a close as 
the leader of the rebel forces (RENAMO), Afonso Dhlakama signed the General 
Peace Accord, together with President Joaquim Chissano, of the Republic of 
Mozambique. 
 
Protocol VI of the Accord provided for the Mozambican government and the 
former rebels, RENAMO, to take responsibility for the implementation of the 
cease fire process and to “…organise and implement mine-clearing operations” 
and assured that they would not “prevent {any} mine-clearing operations”.i  The 
same accord also allowed the UN to verify compliance with the accord. 
 
The subsequent UN deployment, ONUMOZ (Organização Naçional Unido de 
Moçambique) of 6,400 soldiers and UN workers had a mandate that spanned 
from the accord, which provided for them to work with the national authorities to 




clearance plan (based upon an essentially military organisation) was in three 
phases: 
 
1. Clearance of 2,000 km of priority roads to allow access of food supplies to 
refugee camps. 
2. Clearance of further roads to allow refugees to return home. 
3. Setting up training school to train Mozambican deminers to complete the 
remainder of work required.ii 
 
Unfortunately, even though the peace accord had been signed, any effort to 
coordinate demining was delayed until November 1993 and in reality, it was not 
until mid 1994 that efforts began in earnest.  The first two objectives of road 
clearance and opening the way for refugee return were achieved by contracting 
out to commercial organisations to open the roads and the opening of a training 
school in Moamba, Southern Mozambique, began to achieve the third phase. 
 
All these arrangements were carried out under the auspices of ONUMOZ and 
with the oversight of UNOHAC (the predecessor of UNOCHA and working 
within DHA).  It soon however became clear that the concept of training 500 
deminers was not viable unless some organisations were formed which were 
capable of managing their deployment.  With this in mind, ONUMOZ set up the 
Accelerated Demining Programme (ADP) in August 1994.  The programme was 
organised along classic military lines, with Headquarters and ten “platoons” of 
40 deminers each.  At the beginning, the ADP was heavily reliant upon the 40 
plus expatriates working within the programme – a roughly equal split between 
military staff working within ONUMOZ (mainly New Zealand and Australian 
military, with little or no experience of demining) and civilians (a good proportion 
of whom are former military) who were hired for their previous experience within 
mine action programmes or within specific functional areas such as 





It is worth noting that ONUMOZs original intention was to develop ADP into a 
viable national entity, and they hired and trained (on the job) quality national 
staff.  It is also interesting to note the US Ambassador to Mozambique during 
the ONUMOZ period wrote a damning report detailing the failures of the 
mission, in which he states:  “ONUMOZ was the first UN PKO {Peace-Keeping 
Operation} to incorporate a large humanitarian component. Perhaps it should be 
the last (…) In the case of both mine clearance and demobilization, UNOHAC 
insisted on pushing a long-term developmental approach designed to empower 
the local government. Such an approach could never be completed successfully 
and would have jeopardized key parts of the process”.iii  Perhaps he would have 
been less critical with the hindsight of analysing the demining capacities in 
Mozambique today, although it was recognised that the US were particularly 
critical of the UN’s efforts in Mozambique.iv   
 
Blaikie et alv lay down a number of principles for managing disaster recovery.  
Whilst a UN mission post conflict does not fit directly into the category of 
disaster recovery, there are interesting parallels.  Principle 12 proposes that 
efforts should: “Maximise the transition from relief to development”.vi  Blaikie et 
al suggest that “relief creates dependency, so it is vital that as soon as the 
emergency needs are satisfied there is a return to a development approach”.vii  
In Bangladesh following the 1991 cyclone, a refugee was reported as saying 
“we want work, not relief”. viii  The comment would be as appropriate for the 
Mozambican as for the Bangladeshi. 
 
Whilst the UN was clearly attempting to drive the process of clearance forward, 
there was an enormous lack of coordination.  A number of survey and clearance 
projects had been under way since as early as 1991.  Indeed critics asserted 
that demining occurred “despite, not because of the UN”.ix  Unfortunately, these 
efforts were not coordinated and even with the arrival of ONUMOZ, there 





As noted previously, the original intention was always to develop the ADP into a 
fully independent, sustainable Mozambican demining organisation that would be 
passed over to the Mozambican government in 1996.  Training of deminers was 
carried out at the school and in the headquarters and two contractors provided 
‘on the job’ training for the management staff.  After ONUMOZ withdrew in early 
1995, ADP came under the auspices of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs 
(DHA) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).  All parties concerned felt 
that ADP would not be ready to become fully independent of international 
assistance, and ADP became a ‘Nationally Executed Project (NEX)”6 of the 
UNDP in early 1996. 
 
Although a number of key stakeholders did not believe that the Mozambican 
government was ready to take on the ADP, they did accept the government’s 
responsibility to exercise sovereignty over mine action activities by the creation 
in May 1995 of the Comissão Nacional de Desminagem (CND) – the intention 
being to provide a national coordinating body.  CND was an executive branch of 
the National Mine Clearance Commission (NMCC), which comprised the 
Ministers of foreign affairs (as chair), finance, agriculture, public buildings, 
national defence and industry.x  CND was charged at this time with 
coordinating, assisting, proposing, licensing and regulating all mine action 
activities in Mozambique. 
 
Unfortunately however, a number of objectives were not met by NMCC/CND 
and the donors, UN and other actors were beginning to doubt the viability of a 
Mozambican authority with little support from the Governmentxi.  During this 
phase, UNDP became the prime UN point of contact as DHA stepped back and 
focussed on ADP. 
 
At the same time as the formation of the NMCC/CND, both UNDP & DHA were 
tabling a proposal for a Mozambican Mine Action Centre (MOZMAC).  The 
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intention was that MOZMAC would be responsible for all aspects of demining 
(including coordination and execution)xii.  This was the first suggestion in 
Mozambique that a Mine Action Centre be formed.  There was limited support 
but many donors felt this proposal was too top heavy and required too many 
resources.  They may also have felt that the task was beyond the capability of 
the Mozambican government.  With hindsight, that failure to develop MOZMAC 
may well have been a blessing in disguise. 
 
The NMCC failed to collect any form of momentum, and although it was formed 
in May 1995, it did not formally meet until over a year laterxiii.  Its mandate was 
clear: 
 
“{to} collect, process and analyse information and data relevant to demining, elaborate a 
strategy and action plan for mine clearance, and establish procedures for 
setting priorities at the local and national level; monitor and coordinate all 
ongoing demining activities; act as the approval and licensing authority in 
respect of new operators..; adjudicate public tenders for service contracts…; 
and promote and oversee the implementation of a national programme to 
improve public mine awareness.xiv” 
 
In reality, CND failed to achieve any of these objectives and, as a result, many 
of the mine action operators in the country were operating to their own direction, 
with no coordination.  The drive, primarily from the donors but also from 
operators, for improvement eventually led to the restructuring of CND in June 
1999 after more than $10 million had been given by donors in support of 
NMCC/CNDxv. 
 
The restructured organisation, Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (IND) was left 
with a similar mandate to “successfully establish and develop a coordination, 
supervision and management mechanism, in close cooperation with all other 
relevant organisations and agencies, to ensure the cost-effective execution of a 
national mine action plan”xvi, but with much greater autonomy and reporting 
direct to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and outside the cumbersome 




greater success than its predecessor organisation.  The donors have been 
more positive about supporting IND and the future for IND looks to be much 
more secure.  Even though there was some initial scepticism over IND’s ability 
to establish authority over mine action operators who had been working 
effectively independently for the previous eight years, a productive relationship 
has now been established between all the stakeholders in Mozambique. 
 
The ADP has however had different types of difficulties.  Following its early 
success, ADP has continued to move forward and has seldom had a problem 
with funding – something rare in the mine action industry.7  There are a number 
of reasons for this – the organisation is recognised as one of the more effective 
in mine action throughout the world and the donors also trust the organisation to 
a greater extent than many other organisations.  In addition, the ADP has an 
extremely charismatic Director who has been with the programme since 1995 
and has a flair for raising funds from donors.  Unfortunately, there is currently a 
large question mark over the ADP and its status.  Since the formative ONUMOZ 
days, the ADP has evolved from a UN operated and managed programme to 
being an independent NEX project with minimal UNDP involvement.  In 1999, 
ADP began the planning for the process of transformation into a national non-
governmental organisation (NGO), which follows completely the rationale of a 
nationally executed project.  Unfortunately, this is now unlikely to come to 
fruition as a recent consultants’ reportxvii recommended that this transition is not 
a viable option and recommended that ADP should become part of IND, 
although with some autonomy.  The principle reason for this problem is the lack 
of legislation within Mozambique for the support and structuring of NGOs.  It 
appears that there are significant organisational and structural problems 
inherent within this particular recommendation, but it remains to be seen if these 
recommendations are implemented.   
                                                          






Cambodian history is a tragedy in itself.  Since the intervention of the US, the 
Khmer Rouge and the subsequent genocide, huge problems have beset the 
country.  The first landmines were laid in the country by North Vietnamese 
troops in 1967 and throughout the Vietnam War period to protect Vietnamese 
bases and the Ho Chi Minh trail which ran through Eastern Cambodia.  
Between 1969 and 1973, the United States responded in the form of covert 
operations on the ground (including extensive mine laying) and by dropping 
539,129 tonnes of ordnance in and on neutral Cambodia.xviii  In 1970, following 
the overthrow of the Royal government, civil war broke out and mines continued 
to be laid by the succeeding Government and subsequently between 1975 and 
1979, by the ruling Khmer Rouge regime.  Even following the overthrow of the 
Khmer Rouge in 1979, mines continued to be laid by the government as a 
protective act, even as late as 1993, after the deployment of the UN mission to 
Cambodia. 
 
In 1991, with the signing of the Paris Peace Accord, the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was mandated to oversee the 
implementation of the accords and oversee the forthcoming elections.  In 
addition, it was given a mandate of “… assisting with clearing mines and 
undertaking training programmes in mine clearance and a mines awareness 
programme among the Cambodian people.”xix  In December 1991, the advance 
mission of UNTAC set up the Mine Clearance and Training Unit (MCTU) to 
achieve the training element of this mandate.  The TOR of MCTU were very 
clear with an aim of the unit to recruit and train deminers and supervisors and 
also set up the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC).  The plan was to train 
over 5,000 deminersxx.  There was one unfortunate and major glitch with the 
mandate – there were no funds available for the implementation of this plan.  
UNTAC had no specific budget for mine clearance and as such, much of the 
earlier funds were acquired directly from donor countries, outside the standard 




deployment in 1993.  In February 1993, MCTU had trained 1,960 deminers, yet 
1,354 were not employed as deminers.xxi  A second point to note in respect to 
the mandate is that in the early discussion phases, there were no 
considerations made with regards the need to plan and coordinate mine 
clearance activities in the country – including the coordination of NGOs.  With 
hindsight this would prove to be somewhat naïve. 
 
CMAC was formed on 10th June 1992 and was envisaged to oversee mine 
action activities in Cambodia throughout the period and in theory, MCTU was 
subordinate to CMAC.  In reality however, this relationship was virtually non-
existent and there was little interaction between the two.  In fact the 
coordination role envisaged for CMAC was not undertaken at all.  Expatriate 
advisors carried out virtually all management functions and: “were effectively 
operating as Executive Directors of all activities undertaken {by a Cambodian 
agency}…and were not usually familiar with Cambodia culture and tended to 
lack pedagogical skills”xxii.  
 
In 1994, MCTU and CMAC combined under the CMAC umbrella and effectively 
gave the organisation a combined policy setting, management, coordination and 
implementation capacity.  Again, as in Mozambique, in theory this organisation 
had an executive inter ministerial body with representatives from a number of 
government ministries.  CMAC was, in theory, responsible for the coordination 
of all mine action activities in the country, but although some NGOs operating 
were keen to establish links with CMAC, many found themselves unwilling to be 
coordinated by an organisation that had proved itself to be painfully slow and 
inefficient. 
 
CMAC lurched from crisis to crisis without effective resolve and without an 
effective executive body.  A December 1995 UNDP evaluation found that 
CMAC was deficient in terms of: “short and long term planning, monthly cash 
flow crises, and poorly trained mid level management.”xxiii  All this was difficult to 




expatriate technical advisors overseeing the activities.xxiv  This figure actually 
increased to over 60 following this assessment mission.xxv 
 
In 1995, a Royal decree (effectively a statute), changed CMAC’s terms of 
reference and gave CMAC full authority to coordinate all demining activities in 
Cambodia,xxvi as well as to carry out demining activities, and CMAC became an 
autonomous Cambodian institution with an overseeing Governing Council to 
direct the overall policy and direction of the organisation.  The governing council 
never really seemed to have an impact even though the European Commission 
supported it during the years 1997-8.  As in Mozambique, it appears that the 
council was too moribund and bureaucratic to have any real impact. 
 
A further crisis occurred in 1999, which culminated in the removal of the 
Cambodian director of CMAC as well as the resignation of the UNDP Project 
Manager.  It also led to CMAC shedding 90% of its staff of 3,000.  This time the 
catalyst was an allegation of financial impropriety on the part of senior 
management, leading to an audit that confirmed some of the charges on the 
Cambodian side and which was leaked in large part to local news organisations.  
No financial mismanagement was revealed in the UNDP administered Trust 
Fund, but the KPMG audit did describe serious managerial deficiencies.  
Predictably this led to a breakdown of donor confidence in the organisation.xxvii  
Three years on, CMAC now appears to have regained some confidence of the 
donors and had an annual budget in 2001 of $7.5 million as opposed to the $13 
million budget before the scandal.  The organisation now employs 2,264 people.  
The subsequent donor initiated financial and management audit classified 
CMAC as: “seriously deficient” as opposed to the most recent audit results in 
2001 showing the organisation to be “marginally deficient”.xxviii 
 
The need for high-level coordination in Cambodia may be questioned.  In early 
2002, there are only two operators (HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group) 
operationally involved in mine action in Cambodia outside of CMAC.  




on the periphery, have all indicated their intention to work to a central 
coordinating agency and in earlier days did so to some degree to the then 
coordinating agency, CMAC. 
 
The most recent change in the structure of demining in Cambodia has been the 
introduction of a new organisation, the Cambodian (National) Mine Action 
Authority (CMAA), an organisation set up with the intention of coordinating all 
demining activities in Cambodia – again, with parallels to the setting up of the 
IND in Mozambique.  This agency is a government body with a significant 
amount of autonomy.  The organisation is somewhat behind the development 
timeline originally planned – having been set up for over one year (as of June 
2002), it has only two members of staff and one expatriate advisor attached to 
the CMAAxxix.  Nonetheless, it appears to be an appropriate development that 
may lead to the improvement of more focussed coordination activities in 
Cambodia, as well as allowing CMAC to deliver their core business – that of the 
operational delivery of mine action. 
 
Comparison and summary 
Whilst it is clear that the two countries considered are very different in many 
ways, there are undoubtedly parallels and the influences that have affected the 
development will undoubtedly affect the advancement of other future 
programmes around the world.  Both were developed under UN PKO, one of 
which (Cambodia) was under severe strain at the time.  Both went through very 
difficult times and structural difficulties but emerged a decade on into what are 
now beginning to be recognised as structurally sound establishments.   
 
The two countries whose developmental processes have been briefly outlined in 
this chapter are not unique. They represent two typical situations but are unique 
amongst themselves.  Perhaps if a short cut could be found around this 







The aim of this section is to outline the background to the mine action 
environment in Lebanon.  This brief background will be expanded upon in 
chapter 7 where the study will analyse lessons learned against the development 
of the programme 
 
The main landmine problem in Lebanon began during the civil war between 
1975 and 1990.  At the same time, The Israeli Armed Forces (IF) occupied a 
zone in the South of the country to provide a security buffer zone.  Israel and 
their South Lebanon Army (SLA) allies used mines to protect and consolidate 
their positions in the zone of occupation as well as mining the border between 
Israel and Lebanon.  In addition to the civil war, some mines and UXO had been 
left behind from the French Mandate in Lebanon between 1920 and 1943. 
 
Following the period between 1975 and 1990, the Lebanese military began an 
assessment of the country using maps, military records and general 
intelligence. Their conclusion was that there were in the region of 150,000 
mines, excluding the previously occupied zone in the South.xxx 
 
The IF also handed over a number of records of minefields to the United 
Nations peacekeeping operation in place at the time, United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which indicated that there were approximately 
130,000 mines and some 288 booby traps in the former occupied zone.xxxi 
 
In February and June 1999, UNMAS led two inter-agency assessment 
missions, at the request of the Government of Lebanon (GOL), to determine the 
requirement for UN assistance.  The result of the two missions was the 
establishment in July 2000 of a regional (i.e. in the Southern former occupied 
zone) Mine Action Coordination Cell (MACC)8 under the mandate of the UN 
PKO in place then (and still in place), UNIFIL.  The organisation was 




The UN MACC is donor funded through the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), which 
is coordinated by the UNMAS and through assessed contributions from the 
regular UN budget because of the UNIFIL mandate. 
 
The Lebanese military had also been carrying out mine clearance operations 
since the cessation of hostilities in 1990 and in September 1999 a structured 
national body, the National Demining Office (NDO) was established in Beirut.  
The NDO is effectively the de juro national mine action authority and reports to 
the government through the Lebanese Armed Forces.  The Lebanese Armed 
Forces (LAF) had been carrying out clearance operations under the authority of 
the national government.  The NDO was set up with limited financial support 
from the US Government. 
 
Another element added to the complexity of the management of the situation 
when in 2001 the Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) expressed its 
desire to assist the GOL in their efforts to clear landmines.  This effort was in 
the form of a programme called Operation Emirates Solidarity (OES), which 
pledged funding for up to $50 million to fund operational demining support in 
Lebanon.  Unlike the majority of donors, the UAE wished to have direct 
management control of the money they were contributing and as such, 
established a cell, which became attached to the UN MACC as well as the 
NDO.   
 
The coordination of the three extant agencies; the NDO, the UNIFIL MACC and 
the UAE cell presented a problem thus far not encountered anywhere in the 
mine action industry.  Within the realms of the UNIFIL MACC, the integration 
proved to be less difficult that had been first envisaged.  Figure 4-1 shows the 
organisational structure of the UNIFIL MACC in terms of the specific roles 
funded and filled by the UN and the UAE.  It is interesting to note the balance 
between the positions.  The reality of this implementation was that the balance 
                                                                                                                                                                          
8 The UN MACC has changed names a number of times during its existence.  Initially it was the UNIFIL 




was achieved without too many difficulties due to the broad perspective of the 
advisors within the organisation at that time. 
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Organisational Structures and roles and a global model? 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have outlined the current state of the industry in terms of 
the history, development and current state of global mine action. The two case 
studies of Cambodia and Mozambique have given the reader an idea of the 
typical development processes and problems encountered throughout the 
development.  The environment in which the mine action community exists is 
not a vacuum and it is important to realise that there are a large number of 
external influences impacting on the development of strategy and concepts.  
Perhaps one of the best examples of this is the development of the Mine Action 
Coordination Centre (MACC) in Kosovo.  As already mentioned, the Kosovo 
MACC has been called the “most successful mine action centre ever”i.  It is not 
the intention of this study to agree or disagree with that assessment, but it 
isworth noting that the Kosovo environment was unique, with no national 
government in place, and the MACC programme manager acting as the de 
facto Minister of Landmines within a homogeneous and receptive population 
and with an enviable level of resources relative to the scale of the problem. 
 
Both of the two countries identified and outlined in Chapter 3 have been through 
almost 10 years of development since the identification of a requirement to 
establish a mine clearance capacity.  Both responded (or were forced to 
respond) in completely different ways and are now at different phases in their 
development. 
 
There are many good reasons, culturally, politically and practically as to why the 
two countries have developed in such different ways, yet there are also 
common threads throughout both these situations.   
 
Whilst the mine action environment is unique, it is not unreasonable to suppose 




the humanitarian aid sector, where similar problems occur and where strategic 
planning could be applied to optimise future developments. 
 
This chapter will assess the development of organisations in the mine action 
arena. It will consider the roles of culture and organisational structures in the 
development and consider the strategic planning processes that are (or are 
sometimes not) undertaken. 
 
Culture 
Culture is a key element in the development of an organisation and the 
development of a model needs to keep in mind the diverse influences of culture 
on organisations.  The classic theorists of organisational theory have attempted 
to label the way organisations are designed, run and planned.  From the 
“Classical” Approach of Taylor, Urwick, Brech et al, through Mayo and Maslow 
and their “Human Relations” approach, to today’s “Contingency approach” 
encompassing fundamentals of both types of thinking with a holistic perspective 
on the organisation, all theorists have a perspective on the ideal for the 
structure of an organisation. 
 
The influences of culture are manifold.  Culture can be defined as “intellectual or 
moral discipline and training; a state of intellectual and artistic development”ii or 
as a “distinctive pattern of values and beliefs which are characteristic of a 
particular society or sub-group within that society”iii.  Whilst these descriptions in 
themselves help us begin to understand what culture is, it is still a very difficult 
concept to define.  The way we behave and our previous experiences all 
contribute to our reactions to situations – rationality is sometimes difficult to 
relate to reality when decisions and processes are analysed.  The studies of 
organisations by the classicists provide useful ground rules but most of the 
studies were undertaken in western societies.  Organisational culture and 
norms vary hugely between west and east.  Many mine affected countries are 
coming out of long periods of time where normal social structure had broken 




forcibly removed from every single member of society) or where structures and 
systems had been implemented that were completely alien to western society.  
In Mozambique for example, all systems post Portuguese departure in 1975 
were based around Communist systems being imposed over the extant African 
tribal systems. 
 
Many of the difficulties occur when the UN attempts to apply a standard solution 
to a problem.  Often, that solution will be based on a system or structure that 
has been used by a member of the implementing team previously in other 
circumstances.  In terms of the area being studied here, the operational 
elements of both the ADP and the CMAC are built on classic western military 
structures.  In these cases the imposition seems to work and both organisations 
seem to operate effectively and safely in what is potentially a hazardous 
environment.  There are however some dangers: 
 
“And you must know this law of culture:  two civilisations cannot know 
and understand each other well.  You will start going deaf and blind.  You 
will be content in your own civilisation surrounded by the hedge, but 
signals from other civilisations will be as incomprehensible to you as if 
they had been sent by the inhabitants of Venus.”iv  
 
The imposition of a different set of values on an organisation can be hugely 
problematic.  In Cambodia for example, in 1993 at the height of the UNTAC 
deployment, the average pay of a Government minister was $68/month, and a 
deminer earned $125/month.  In this case, the whole of CMAC was on the 
same upwardly distorted salary scale.  In Mozambique in 1995, the head of the 
CND was earning a government salary of in the region of $120/month; an ADP 
deminer was earning $200/month and the Director of ADP was earning around 
$5,000/month.  In cases like this, there are clearly huge difficulties and 
government employees (who are also part of the “capacity development” 




from keeping the process moving forward at a reasonable speed.  This almost 
guarantees resentment; it also is an invitation to corruption. 
 
Culture is still a subject strongly debated between experts.  Robins states: 
“Most people are unaware just how their culture will affect them.  Culture is like 
fish to water.  It is there all the time but the fish are oblivious to it.” v  Within 
organisations, we find ourselves with a grouping of individuals with widely 
different backgrounds, upbringings and beliefs all of who meld together into an 
organisation with one corporate goal.  In developing countries as well, some of 
the influences may be less positive, indeed, some of the actors may well be 
operating in competition with the organisational objectives for personal reasons. 
In his treatise on international relations, Machiavelli notes:  
 
“There is nothing more difficult to plan… more doubtful of success… nor 
more dangerous to manage… than the creation of a new system.  For 
the innovator has enemies of all who profit by the preservation of the old 
way…and merely lukewarm defenders in those who gain by the new.”vi   
 
One suspects that Machiavelli may have had in mind an organisation that was 
mono-cultural, but whilst this was written some 500 years ago, there are still 
many truisms within and it appears as valid today as it did then. 
 
Technical Advice and Culture Clash 
In the early days, the modus operandi of the UN when setting up a MAC or 
national institution was to overload the country with expatriates who may or may 
not have had experience in setting up similar programmes in other parts of the 
word.  Mozambique had ONUMOZ and Cambodia had UNTAC.  In the early 
stages, many of these advisors were military and inexperienced with the 
situations they might face in a developing country, particularly ones so 
damaged by war.  The logic and rationale for such a method may seem clear 
but military forces are not always renowned for their cultural sensitivity.  This 





“United Nations personnel in the field, perhaps more than any others, are 
obliged to respect local norms, cultures and practices.  They must go out 
of their way to demonstrate that respect, as a start, by getting to know 
their local environment and trying to learn as much of the local culture 
and language as they can.  They must behave with the understanding 
that they are guests in someone else’s home, however destroyed that 
home might be, particularly when the United Nations takes on a 
transitional authority role.”vii  
 
There are however a number of militaries who have made a speciality out of 
such operations.  New Zealand for example has a cadre of officers who have 
specialised in the setting up and development of such operations and as such 
maintain a certain credibility and skill.  For short-term assignees, militaries tend 
to assign staff on short durations of 6 months and recognise (off the record) that 
their staff tend to draw more from the experience than they give back.  The 
national and long – term expatriate staff would agree with that assessment 
more publicly.  Often a six-month deployment means three months 
acclimatising to the culture, perhaps two relatively effective months, followed by 
a month winding down prior to return.  In these circumstances, it is no wonder 
that there is a certain amount of cynicism at the input the military have into 
HMA. 
 
Not for profit culture 
Another interesting perspective is the dynamics of a not for profit organisation. 
Commercial organisations are generally operating with the primary objective of 
making money.  National Mine Action Programmes are clearly not (although 
there are sometimes commercial organisations operating in the arena who may 
well work with, or for, these mine action programmes).  The differences may be 
significant, but Handy suggests that the differences should not be interpreted to 





“… voluntary organisations are not businesses, but they do have clients, they 
provide services and they have to finance themselves in one way or another.  It 
makes just as much sense to ask a voluntary organisation what its strategy is 
as it does to ask a business.  It is not sinful to be business-like [authors 
emphasis].”viii 
 
In more recent years, the use of strategic planning tools has introduced more 
cost-effective, value-added and results-based measures to the humanitarian 
arena, something that had not always been a priority for donors.  FitzGerald and 
Neal suggest that commercial companies offer an efficient business approach 
and the diplomatic experience to operate in the humanitarian environmentix and 
that these companies can maintain shareholder value, whilst at the same time 
catering to the needs of the donors, host governments and local communities 
as well.  There is a suggestion that NGOs could do well to learn some lessons 
from such organisations.  In a separate report, Harpviken et al suggest that: 
“Even in the NGO sector, many would argue that {commercial companies’} 
presence has stimulated efforts to increase cost-effectiveness in the sector 
more generally.”x   
 
Miles and Snowxi developed a series of frameworks for organisations against 
which comparisons or benchmarking exercises could be undertaken.   These 
models examined how organisations adapted to changes in their environment.  
Essentially they intended the framework to be used to “describe organisational 
behaviours and prescribe alternative directions for change where necessary”.  
Miles & Snow categorised the four configurations as: Defender, Prospector, 
Analyser and Reactor.  A summary of the features of these four types is shown 





Table 5-1 – Miles & Snow’s Typology 
Type  
Defender Essentially Conservative & mature.  Enjoys stability and aims 
for efficiency.  Management is expert in their own field of 
operations and does not strive to operate outside that domain.  
Organisation will aggressively defend if it feels threatened 
Prospector Opposite end of scale to defender.  Seek innovation but do not 
strive for efficiency.  Will often cause change for changes sake 
in order to exploit the opportunities created.  They look to 
operate within a broad and continually developing domain. 
Analyser Operates in both domains.  Tries to have the best of both 
worlds.  Develops strong stable base but also seeks 
occasionally to act as prospector, looking for opportunities to 
exploit. 
Reactor Can identify changes in their environment but does not have 
the capacity to respond.  Lack structural and managerial ability 
to exploit changing environment and will only make 
adjustments if forced to do so. 
 
 
An alternative benchmarking process has been proposed by Handy who 
classified the culture of organisations into four distinct types:xii 
• The club culture 
• The role culture 
• The task culture 
• The person culture 
 





Table 5-2 – Handy’s Typology 
Type Description 
Club Key to the organisation is one individual, centrally 
located.  Could be interpreted as a dictatorship.  At 
best based on trust and communication.  Thrive when 
speed of response and personality are important – in “guerrilla 
warfare and politics”.  Many club cultures feel nepotistic and too 
‘closed’ to those outside. 
Role Formalised communications, logical 
and rational and follow rules and 
procedures.  Organisation has 
standards, quality controls and 
evaluation procedures.  Generally found in mature organisations.  
Work well in routine, stable and unchanging environment 
Task  
Evolved in response to speedier change than role but 
less individualistic than club.  Organisations thrive in 
problem solving situations needing more than one person to input. 
Person Stars loosely grouped in an organisation make up the 
person type organisation.  Individual talent is all-
important.  These professionals need to be run on a 
loose reign.   




Whilst this categorisation of organisations in such simplistic terms may be 
somewhat idealistic, the point is that we become adapted to the particular style 
or method based often upon more a matter of faith than of logic – in other 
words, whichever society we were nurtured within is most likely to be the one 





Unfortunately, it is often the case that the clash between two cultures is 
compounded by the organisational design as described above.  Someone who 
has spent their formative years in a role type organisation will feel 
uncomfortable if they then find themselves working within a club type 
organisation.  Even more difficult to analyse are those persons for whom any of 
these working environments are alien. 
 
It seems from experience in the field, that the two more commonly found 
structures encountered are the club and role type organisations.  Unfortunately, 
they often clash with the expatriate technical advisors often coming from typical 
role stereotypes and the local institutions having a club culture. 
 
In cross-cultural situations, behaviours can either be attributed to the situation 
(i.e. cultural differences) or to the personal characteristics of the individual, such 
as laziness, arrogance or disrespect.  It is important to understand the cultural 
environment in order to make these attributions correctly.  Gordon suggests 
that: 
 
 “For example, managers of a multi-cultural workforce must not equate 
poor grammar or mispronunciation with a lack of ability because it often 
indicates use of a second language instead.” xiii 
 
This does not bode well for the parachuting in of expatriate technical advisors to 
projects where they are not prepared to begin to understand the culture of the 
environment to which they are applied. 
 
Planning 
Planning processes can also differ significantly based on cultural background.  
How for example, does one convince a Khmer who has spent 30 years at war, 3 
years under the Khmer Rouge with no guarantees of even the next meal, and 
may never have received any formal education that it is essential to draw up 





The western world generally uses a formal structure for planning and it has 
been well documented.9   Figure 5-1 places the formal and informal planning 
processes side by side as a direct comparison.xiv  The formal process provides 
what the west considers to be a logical clear process by which the strategic 
planner can develop a plan.  Establishment of the strategic direction, definition 
of strategies and the achievement of those strategies as well as the essential 
feedback loops within the process allow for a logical progression from one step 












Define Strategies Achieve Strategies
Informal Strategic
thinking
Figure 5-1 – Strategic Planning processes 
Formal Strategic thinking
   
Often however, any planning system in place in a less developed country will be 
an informal planning process.  At the bottom of Figure 5-1 is a representation of 
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Corporate Strategy”, (Prentice Hall Europe, 1999). 
 
the informal process for strategic planning.  The arrows entering from the 
bottom indicate the relatively random and broad inputs into the process that are 
applied in an informal culture.  Whilst in many situations this thinking “out of the 
box” is productive and can benefit the organisation substantially, it is not 
necessarily always so.  Creative thought and a creative culture however are 
often seen as a virtue in western societies, yet in other societies, there is 
distinct discouragement to think laterally. 
 
The development of strategy in itself however is not necessarily the be all and 
end all.  There is an interesting suggestion that, whilst a superior strategy may 
be necessary, it is seldom sufficient on its own.  Koopman suggests that the key 
attributes separating organisations that succeed brilliantly rather than those who 
succeed with mediocrity, is usually the execution.  The irony, he goes on to say, 
is that few strategies are bad, and even fewer are fatal.xv 
 
Even further, Mintzberg suggests that formal planning may not necessarily be 
the best way to develop an organisation.  He suggests that strategic planning in 
itself may actually be overly restrictive in certain organisations.  He says: 
“{strategy is} a creative phenomenon that depends more upon redrawing lines 
than on respecting them”.xvi  His overarching argument is that the formalisation 
of strategic planning stifles human creativity and that it is virtually impossible to 
make valuable judgement and decisions on purely quantative data.  A system 
based on emergent planning is recommended by Mintzberg allowing the 
creativity of the human mind to be best utilised.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the influence that culture has on the development 
of an organisation and the structural difficulties therein.  The problems incurred 
with imposition of external values is noted and it is clear that what is required in 
the early stages (the emergency stage) of a programme are not necessarily 
what is required in the latter stages (the development stage).  That juxtaposition 




difficulty links to the development of plans and the fundamental philosophical 
difference required in this planning between national staff and expatriate staff 
whose norms and values may differ significantly. 
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Formalising and integrating the approach 
 
The previous chapters have described the outline of the mine action industry 
and explained the problems behind the setting up of national programmes.   
Whilst these problems are manifold, they are not insurmountable.  This chapter 
will consider the benefits of different structures as applied in a number of 
programmes and alternatives to the ‘standard’ approach.  The importance of 
considering the position of the host nation in terms of emergency and 
development will also be noted as will the role of staff in the transition of the 
programme from emergency to development. 
 
A recent study undertaken for the Swedish government assessing the benefits 
attributable to their donations to mine actioni grouped the main options for 
setting up a coordinating body into the ‘standard’ UN MAC model, the 
government model and the NGO implementation model.  The three are studied 
briefly here before looking at the wider issues. 
 
Structural environment 
In a previous projectii, a stakeholder analysis of the mine action environment 
was undertaken.  At the national level, the MAC was identified as a key 
stakeholder in the environment.  The study suggests that the MAC (assuming 
its position as a central body) in a country is: “…one of the few organisations 
that is genuinely capable of coordinating the mine action in country” … “the 
authority that upholds and monitors mine action organisations against 
International Standards” and that the greatest strength of a MAC is: “its ability to 
coordinate activity across a whole system…it can coordinate other 
stakeholders, from NGOs to deminers, and it can coordinate all HMA 





The report also goes on to note that one of the greatest weaknesses attributed 
to most MACs is: “their time of arrival in theatre [sic]” suggesting that detailed 
planning is not usually carried out before the deployment of a set up team. 
 
Harpviken et al however, view the problem from a different perspective.  They 
identify a number of implementation channels for HMA projects.  They note that 
the most common is the UN MAC concept, but identify two further channels for 
implementation within HMA.  The second channel they identify is the use of 
extant government institutions and the third being the use of commercial 
companies.iv  They summarise the criticisms and merits of the three alternate 
methods of implementation and contend that the NGO option has the greatest 
number of advantages because of the NGO’s ability to adapt to the needs of a 
particular context.  They do however criticise NGOs for their general lack of 
capacity building.  They summarise by stating:  
 
“Most fundamentally, the strengths and weaknesses of different 
implementing channels will vary according to context.  In a stable political 
situation with legitimate and competent government agencies, the 
arguments for NGOs or commercial operators appear to be weak.  
NGOs, on the other hand, appear to have been doing a good job in 
situations of political turmoil, whilst commercial companies operate best 
when there is some degree of political stability.”v 
 
Historically, primarily as a result of the influential DHA study in 1997, the UN in 
particular, and a number of other donors, have steered toward the MAC 
implementation approach.  The emphasis was particularly focussed on allowing 
the MAC to pose as a coordinating body, and having the authority to 
subcontract independent agencies (NGOs, commercial or possibly 
governmental {such as military} organisations) to conduct HMA operations.  






The Government implementation model 
The Harpviken study goes on to note that the second channel, implementation 
by the government, has had few opportunities to be analysed.  There is a 
programme in Nicaragua where the government (with a great deal of assistance 
from the Organisation of American States) has assumed virtually all 
responsibility for mine action in the country, including prioritisation of tasks, 
general HMA coordination and HMA operational implementation (which is 
carried out by the Nicaraguan military).  A similar situation is also in place in 
Columbia. 
 
Although in Nicaragua and Columbia (as well as in the rest of Latin America), 
the scale of the mine problem has never reached the scale of the likes of 
Cambodia and Afghanistan, this works to some advantage for the national 
governments in that it is far simpler to envisage an end state and, as such, 
easier to plan accordingly.  However, with around 80 victims per yearvi in 
Nicaragua and 243 (although it is worth noting that 105 of those were police or 
military) in Columbia in the first 10 months of 2001vii, it is clearly a problem that 
governments take seriously. 
 
In Nicaragua, the choice of the government to use the military to carry out 
demining operations was not taken by default.  Nicaragua took a clear decision 
that it wished to effectively take control of its own destiny and NGOs were not 
felt to have “added value”.  Unfortunately, as the study states:  
 
“Although the military is accountable to the government, the government 
is not accountable to anyone.  In theory, the NDC {National Demining 
Commission} is mandated to control decisionmaking (sic) regarding 
priorities.  In reality, the NDC lacks the expertise to make decisions and 
winds up rubber-stamping government decisions.”viii 
 
It can therefore be seen that there is clearly more than one way to approach a 




factor that needs to be borne in mind during the initiation of a mine action 
programme. 
 
The NGO implementation channel 
The third method of implementation noted in the study is that of NGO led 
programmes and the example of the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) run 
programme in Northern Iraq is cited.  The study suggests that the benefits of 
MAGs flexibility in operating in this environment (albeit that there is no 
operational government within the region) and the NGO ability to innovate, 
without the sometimes constrictive bureaucracy of a large organisation.  There 
is some general criticism of lack of capacity building, but the study also notes 
that from a start in 1992 where the programme had 14 expatriates, the 
programme had scaled down to 4 in 2000.ix 
 
From emergency to development 
Critical to the development and structuring of any HMA organisation is the state 
of the country at the particular time of implementation – in other words; where 
the country falls on the ‘emergency – development continuum;’ whether the 
country is considered to be in a state of complex emergency or whether it is 
partly through a redevelopment initiation phase is a very significant factor.  As 
Harpviken et al say:  
 
“Too often, when a situation is defined as an emergency it serves as an 
excuse for launching short-sighted operations, even though 
consideration of the broader and more long-term implications of an 
intervention is no less important in an emergency situation…Additionally, 
it is often true that what is first seen as an emergency requires a long-
term response.  This is indeed the case with HMA.  Most cases that have 
a dramatic mine problem that can be solved within a short time frame will 
also have a more enduring mine problem of a less dramatic character 





It seems, therefore, that one of the critical factors impinging on the 
implementation of a programme on a country should be that country or region’s 
position on the ‘emergency – development continuum’. 
 
Many of the countries that require UN support are right at the beginning of the 
continuum and tend to be classified as an emergency operation.  In theory, all 
UN mine action efforts are coordinated by the UNMAS, which should be 
cognisant of the impact of the timing  - effectively placing the country on this 
continuum.  Again, in theory, the UNMAS takes advice from the UNDP Mine 
Action Team (MAT) who will advise on precisely this issue and on the 
development of a sustainable capacity.  This development should consider the 
whole range of options, from the basic training of deminers through to creating 
capacity at the governmental level (which is where the UNDP focus tends to 
be). 
 
The UNDP recognises that there is potential for conflict between the emergency 
start-up phase of an operation and attempt to include plans for the development 
right from the start.  In a recent article, Ian Mansfield, former team leader of the 
UNDP MAT, outlined a set of principles that should be adhered to during the 
build up and development of a MAC (or indeed a Mine Action Coordination 
Centre – MACC).xi   
 
Mansfield notes that capacity building, which is traditionally (within UNDP) 
aimed at national and local governmental level, should be applied throughout, 
and at all levels of, mine action activity.  He produced a model of how he 
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Figure 6-1 - Proposed National Mine Action Structure 
 
 
It is however worth reinforcing the Harpviken quote: “Additionally, it is often true 
that what is first seen as an emergency requires a long-term response.”xii  Yet 
again, the importance of differentiating between emergency and development, 
and at all levels, is emphasised.  
 
Management perspectives 
Perhaps one of the other problems is the significant difference of management 
styles required for running an emergency operation as opposed to a 
developmental programme.  In the emergency phase, management style is 
required to be ‘hands-on’; inspirational; and could be classified as a ‘Prospector’ 
or ‘Club’ type styles.  As the continuum moves on, the requirement for 
management style shifts across to a requirement for a ‘Defender’ or ‘Role’ type 
organisations.  One of the difficulties is of course recognising the requirement to 




this to happen.  Of course it may be impractical to change the whole staff of an 
organisation after a relatively short period of time, but it may be necessary to 
change some of the key players.  Unfortunately it is often those key players who 
need to make the decisions to change and it is quite likely that this will not be a 
decision that comes easily.  Fitzgerald and Neal recognise this when they say: 
“An operation may start as an international emergency and as such, agencies 
may take whatever measures are deemed necessary.  However, as the 
situation progresses, the emphasis in skills may move from technical to 
management.”xiii  
 
The deployment of international military advisors into the setting up of a new 
organisation fits reasonably well into this model.  Albeit the military tend to be of 
a ‘Defender’ or ‘Role’ type people by the nature of their organisations, the 
individuals tend to be flexible enough to set up a reactive, ‘Prospector’ type 
organisation. 
 
The role of the military is also considered in the Brahimi report, which 
recommends the UN consider greater use of the military in PKOs.  The UN 
Standby Assistance System (UNSAS) maintains an ‘on call’ capability to deploy 
military (as well as police and specialised civilian assets) within 7, 14, 30, 60 or 
90 days notice.  The report recommends augmentating the existing 
arrangements.xiv  At first glance this seems to make sense.  Whilst UNMAS do 
not currently have a formal role within the UNSAS, they have made a number of 
recommendations to DPKO (who oversee the UNSAS) and the UNSAS will in 
future, if required, include an emergency logistics support capacity including a 
number of demining ‘kits’ for rapid deployment from the UN logistics base in 
Brindisi.xv  What must never be forgotten however is the input of UNDP in the 
planning and deployment process.  It is interesting to note that the UNDP MAT 
in New York now consists completely of specialists who have no intimate 
experience of military systems and modus operandi. This is certainly no bad 




developmental sector and perhaps even consider expanding their skills base to 
include more of a focus on developmental issues. 
 
The Brahimi recommendation fits relatively comfortably with the current UNMAS 
plans for the development of a rapid reaction response team.  The rapid 
Reaction Plan (RRP), currently under development by UNMAS is planned to 
enable UNMAS to ensure an:  “effective, proactive and coordinated response to 
landmine contamination in both humanitarian emergency situations, and 
insupport of peacekeeping operations.”xvi  On a positive note, it is encouraging 
to see that the RRP calls for the UNDP to be responsible for: “participat{ion} in 
discussions regarding longer-term capacity building activities.”xvii 
 
One further point to note is the selection of expatriates sent as advisors or 
programme managers.  In the early stages, the great majority of these positions 
were selected on their technical (and often specialist EOD) skills.  Whilst there 
is increasing recognition that these skills are not necessary to advise on the 
structure, set up and development of programmes, it seems that this has taken 
time to filter down to the ground.  Still, many of the current technical advisors 
are former military officers with a technical focus.  In the emergency stage of an 
operation, this does no harm at all; indeed it may well be beneficial.  Where the 
real problem begins however, is the continuation of these staff into the deep 
developmental stage and the UN (MAS, OPS and DP) need to consider 
expanding the pool of development specialists within mine action.  This is not to 
say that all technicians are unable to make the transition to viewing the situation 
from a developmental perspective, merely that it may be simpler to find the right 
skills in the first place. 
 
Conclusion 
The debate over the best structure for a national programme remains.  UN, 
NGO or governmental structures all have their place depending upon their 
position along the emergency – development continuum.  In addition to the 




varies significantly as well.  Early stages require ‘doers’ and later stages require 
‘developers’ – something that does not seem to have received the full attention 
of the planners thus far. 
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Lessons learned in Lebanon 
 
The intention of this chapter is to look at the initiation of a very recent 
programme and analyse how any lessons learned from previous experience 
were noted and applied in this process.  The very recent development of mine 
action in Lebanon since 1999, when the Government of Lebanon (GOL) first 
established a structured national body (the National Demining Office {NDO}), 
will be used as a model.  The more general background to the development of 
Lebanon has already been given in chapter four and the following section aims 
to develop on that and analyse the lessons learned from the Lebanon 
programme. 
 
UN Assessment Missions and results 
 
There have been a number of UN assessment missions in Lebanon over recent 
years.  In 1999, an interagency mission led by UNMAS proposed a MACC to be 
formed as part of UNIFIL.  A mission by UNMAS immediately prior to the 
formation of the UNIFIL MACC consolidated this in 2000.   
 
The 2000 mission recommended a three-phase procedure to initiate the 
programmei and a suggested a detailed breakdown of the support provided 
which is shown at Annex E.ii The concept of the 2000 mission was to develop a 
coordinated national response, “under the guidance of the personal 
representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the UN Resident 
Coordinator and the Force Commander UNIFIL” and emphasised that “the 
programme will focus on what can realistically be achieved in the short term to 
accelerate mine action on the ground and to enhance the national capacity to 
provide a medium-to-longer term sustainable response.” iii  The three phases of 
the UNIFIL MACC were: 
 
1. The establishment, mine awareness and liaison phase.  This initial 
phase was planned to take up to the end of 2001 and, although this was 




NGOs (particularly those working within the mine awareness {now known 
as Mines Risk Education – MRE}) already working in Lebanon, who had 
difficulty with the imposition of a coordinating agency.  This had already 
proved to be a problem in both Cambodia and Mozambique during the 
establishment of CMAA and CND/IND.  In Lebanon, it should 
theoretically have been easier to implement this regime because the 
NGOs had not been established for a great period of time.  As an aside, 
most NGOs would state that they fully support coordination-based 
policies.  Nonetheless, in the early stages, this difficulty created extra 
work for the recently established UNIFIL MACC 
 
2. Consolidation Phase.  The programme would build upon the 
developments of Phase 1 by continuing to develop the emergency mine 
action plan to facilitate the safe return of Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs), and enhance the mobility of UNIFIL troops.  The actual 
implementation of phase 2 was again problematic and it was at this stage 
that the coordination between the national authority, the NDO, and the 
UN MACC became a major issue.   
 
The NDO at this point began to open up their relationship with the UNIFIL 
MACC in Tyre.  The NDO had recently received a technical advisor, who 
reported to the head of the NDO and to the UNDP resident representative in 
Lebanon.  The advisor also received policy guidance and technical 
backstopping from the UNDP MAT in New York.  The appointment of this 
position meant that the relationship opportunities between the two agencies 
were expanded and national planning began to be seriously considered.  
There was however still some difficulty between the GOL and the UN and 
the liaison was far from perfect. 
 
3. The final phase of the project. This phase was to assist in the 
development of a medium to long-term mine action response to rid South 




established during the previous phases would then be integrated into a 
national mine action programme managed by the GOL, coordinated 
through the NDO and supported by the UNDP. 
 
By this stage relationships between the NDO and UNIFIL MACC had 
improved to the point where the two organisations were prepared to begin 
working on the development of a national plan.  This plan was presented to 
the GOL in May 2001.  In addition the UNIFIL MACC programme manager 
was tasked to begin detailed planning of the integration of the OAE project.  
The GOL, UN and UAE ratified the subsequent MOU in October 2001 and 
almost immediately began the process of developing the UNIFIL MACC 
with the UAE funded positions inside the organisation.  One of the primary 
reasons for the positive way that the UAE moved forward in the integration 
into the UNIFIL MACC was its desire that all its operations be carried out in 
accordance with the recently introduced International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS), the development of which was led by the UN.  The UAE 
thus saw the UN as the key to implementing operations in accordance with 
IMAS. 
 
Once the MOU was signed between the UAE, GOL & The UN, the UAE 
then began the process of issuing tender documents for the operational 
work to be funded by them.  They dealt with this contracting process 
themselves, outside of the UNIFIL MACC, although the NDO and the UN 
MACC were informed of developments.  In addition, the UAE went through 
the UNIFIL MACC to ask the assistance of the UNOPS Mine Action Unit in 
New York, to contract for the quality assurance and monitoring of the work 
they contracted out.iv  
The shift from UNIFIL MACC to the South Lebanon MACC 
 
In February 2001, a high level mission consisting of the chiefs of both UNMAS 
and UNDP recommended moving the UNIFIL MACC away from UNIFIL and 
strengthening the relationship with the NDO.  This mission recognised that a 




operations did not extend to the south of the country, where it was becoming 
apparent that there was a significant humanitarian problem.  The mission 
recommended a strategy, of which the two objectives were to: 
 
• “ensure the acceleration of mine action operations, particularly in the 
south. 
• assist the Government of Lebanon in strengthening its capacity in all 
areas of mine action.”v 
 
This shift occurred over the course of 2001 until the UNIFIL MACC effectively 
ceased to exist and the organisation became the South Lebanon MACC (the 




One of the less positive elements of this phase was the planned capacity 
building element.  The UNDP had been working towards the development of a 
“capacity building” position within the NDO to aid the long-term viability and 
national ownership of the coordination process.  Unfortunately, the politics 
within the NDO made this extremely difficult and the advisor found it virtually 
impossible to make any headway in the development of a long-term national 
capacity.  As the UN MACC annual report for 2001 states:   
 
“UNDP was facing difficulty in achieving the desired partnership with the 
NDO for this project and by year’s end it looked most likely that the 
capacity building support project would be withdrawn.  While this would 
not stop the UN MACC’s immediate and intermediate term objectives it 
would require a rescheduling of the UN MACC exit strategy and re-think 
on how best to achieve any sort of integration with the NDO.”vi 
 
As a result of this, the advisor was not replaced at the end of his contract at the 
end of 2001.  The perspective of the GOL was that there was little need for 




UNDP was that there was little value in staffing this position in the absence of a 
receptive national counterpart.vii 
 
In early 2002, a key personality with the NDO was replaced, and as a result, the 
approach of the GOL long-term capacity development shifted to a much more 
forward thinking position and at this time, plans are being made to fill the 
position of “capacity development” technical advisor, supported by the UNDP in 
the NDO.viii 
 
The most significant breakthrough however has been the establishment of a 
more open and cooperative dialogue with the NDO that had previously been 
very protective of its role and mandate. During the earlier stages in the 
development of the UNIFIL MACC it had been made clear that the NDO did not 
support the establishment of it and it appeared that they felt threatened by the 
existence of the UNIFIL MACC.  Over time many of the negative perceptions 
held by the NDO toward the UNIFIL MACC have been changed as a more open 
and transparent working relationship has developed.  This relationship will be 
further strengthened in 2002 as the strengthened MACC in South Lebanon 
takes shape..ix 
 
Lessons learned from previous set-ups 
The UNIFIL MACC in Southern Lebanon was initiated some 10 years after the 
organisations in Cambodia and Mozambique.  Although the institutional 
structures were different in all cases, it is important to assess just how effective 
this implementation has been and what mistakes were made along the way. 
 
The Eaton et al DHA study undertaken in 1997 outlined a number of 
conclusions and recommendations (see Annex D).  Although clearly not all of 
these conclusions are relevant to the development of a programme in Lebanon, 
and there are individual elements of the new programme there that require 





Recommendation number eight suggests that:   
 
“… the UN should take a proactive role in needs assessment, planning 
and, when necessary, the creation of Mine Action Centres.  This should 
include assistance with resource mobilization and the development of 
skills needed to ensure continuity and sustainability.  Support should be 
provided in a manner which will allow for a seamless transition between 
the initiation and consolidation phases.”x 
 
In the case of Lebanon, the assessment and planning elements were 
successfully undertaken with the formation of the UNIFIL MACC.  It seems 
however that the development of a successful link to the government structure, 
as well as the evolution of a viable capacity development plan and exit strategy 
(in other words the implementation of the consolidation phase) was not carried 
out successfully and the UNIFIL MACC was established without the genuine 
support of the national authorities.  Whilst UNMAS did write to the GOL to open 
a dialogue, the GOL did not reply and UNMAS did not follow up in this issue 
and thus no formal agreement was put in place.xi   
 
A “lessons learned” report issued to UNOPS from the UNIFIL MACC in January 
2001 proposes that: “{in future projects} The Project must be approved, or at 
least supported by, the Host Government.”xii.  Clearly in this case, it would have 
been much more effective if the support of the GOL were obtained before 
implementation of the UNIFIL MACC, even though it were initially within the 
UNIFIL mandate and, as such, not technically required to obtain this authority.  
The lack of coordination between the NDO and the UNIFIL MACC produced 
considerable problems in the early stages of the programme.   
 
The same report identified a problem in the coordination at the headquarters 





“UNMAS, if establishing a project in country, must ensure that it 
adequately consults with all interested parties in the host country.  It is 
important that duplication of effort is avoided and that there are no 
misunderstandings as to the purpose and roles of the various agencies 
or organisations.  In the case of Lebanon, the US Government had 
assisted the Government of Lebanon with the establishment of the 
National Demining Office.  The UNMAS Project was not incorporated into 
the development plans of the NDO and hence there exists some 
confusion between US objectives, NDO objectives, UNDP objectives, 
and the UN MACC.”xiii   
 
Clearly this should be a fundamental element in the planning of any particular 
programme and seems to have failed in the case of the UNIFIL MACC. 
 
More positively, the Eaton et al DHA study also specified a number of other 
issues that they felt strongly should be implemented.  There are a number 
which appear to have been adopted and which, it could be argued, have 
contributed significantly to the development of a relatively successful 
programme.  Two of these in particular are worth noting: 
 
RECOMMENDATION ONE: “In line with its central coordination 
responsibilities, the MAC will generally be responsible for planning, for a 
central data bank on minefield information, for resource mobilization, for 
monitoring, and overall programme development {…} It should also act as 
the country’s regulatory agency”.xiv 
 
Whilst the UNIFIL MACC is in an exceptional situation, with a responsibility only 
for a specific region of the country (i.e., South Lebanon within UNIFILs area of 
operations), it coordinates all MA activities within this area.  The UNIFIL MACC 
in addition maintained a central database (Information Management System for 
Mine Action – IMSMA) which is now closely coordinated with the NDO, who 




element within these recommendations is that of regulation and accreditation of 
operational capacities.  Within the remit of OES, the UN MACC is fully 
responsible, through the NDO, for the accreditation and coordinating of 
operational assets within South Lebanon with the NDO being responsible for 
the formal licensing of these assets 
 
RECOMMENDATION TWO: “Donor nations that choose to fund NGOs and 
commercial entities directly should do so through a tripartite agreement 
involving the donor, the implementing agency, and the Mine Action Centre.  
This will facilitate coordination and ensure adherence to standards”.xv 
 
Again, this has proved to be a great success.  OES pledged to fund the 
implementation of up to US$50 million of operational support through the 
UNIFIL MACC and have provided a number of key positions with the 
organisation.  Even more positively, the UAE (clearly supported by the UN) 
insisted on the application of the recently introduced IMAS on all mine action 
activities to be carried out in the country under their funding remit.  This is in 
itself a huge step forward and supports and reinforces the UN (and the 
practitioners in the community) in their desire to regulate the industry into a 
professional standards led industry. 
 
RECOMMENDATION THREE: “The MAC should take a proactive role 
in ensuring that expatriate Technical Advisers have appropriate 
qualifications and skills needed for the task of training and transfer of 
knowledge.  Similarly, an effort must be made to avoid the rapid turnover 
of personnel involved in training activities.  All such personnel should be 
available for a minimum of 12 months and, preferably, for 24 months”.xvi  
 
This is another area where the UN MACC has proved to be a success.  The key 
advisor, the Chief Technical Advisor, has been in place since the beginning of 
the programme in July 2000 and has remained in place.  He is eminently 




stage.  Similarly placed is the advisor for information management, a Somali 
whose skills and cultural approach are well placed for the situation. 
 
Lebanon’s unique perspective 
 
Clearly the unique circumstances in Lebanon, with the separation of South 
Lebanon from the government’s programme, caused difficulties, but it does 
allow the two organisations to operate side by side with a certain amount of 
complimentarity yet focus on their particular areas. The NDO, operating 
throughout the country, with the exception of the South, have focussed on data 
gathering and are coordination two survey projects (Landmine impact survey 
and a technical survey) which will enable a much clearer picture of the mine 
problem in Lebanon to be reached.  These surveys will also cover the South 
and will assist the MACC.  The MACC on its part, has focussed on the 
application of standards and the coordination of efforts in the south, together 
with the coordination of the OES project. 
 
Such hybrid projects may well be implemented again in other locations, 
particularly in the context of a competent and stable government.  In this 
particular case, UNMAS led on the development and seemed not to be 
particularly cognisant of the UNDP input.  In future cases, these liaisons 
between the two agencies need to be reinforced. 
 
 
One of the major opportunities in Lebanon has been the development of the 
relationship between the three agencies involved.  In many programmes, the 
problems in the development of relationships between a national government 
and the UN are difficult enough.  The potential for problems within Lebanon, 
with the involvement of an additional government (the UAE) were therefore 
increased significantly.  Yet, although there have been significant obstacles 
along the way, the status of the programme(s) at the moment demonstrate that 
it is possible to achieve a successful organisation within such constraining 




the general selection of technical advisors with the right skills set, although 
there were exceptions.   
 
It is also interesting to consider where the national government is on the 
“emergency – development continuum”.  In both Cambodia and Mozambique, 
the development of CMAC/CMAA/CND/IND/ADP was all undertaken under 
relatively ineffective governments at the time.  In these cases, the UN took the 
lead without too much concern over the influence of the governments and with 
inadequate reference (in hindsight) to it, and focussed on both initiating the 
programme and looking at the longer-term development of the programme, 
combined with the wider UN position of supporting the incremental development 
of the country.  In more recent cases, it may not necessarily be the case that a 
programme is set up under a weak government.  Lebanon, for example, has 
(and had during the initiation phase) a very capable government whose major 
problem was their inability to fund demining operations in their country.  The 
same goes for Eritrea, where a recent UN programme was established within a 
country with a strong, effective and coordinated government and a recently 
initiated UN MACC.10  The difference seems to be that in Cambodia and 
Mozambique, the steps along the emergency – development continuum were 
taken sequentially, whereas with the strong governments of Lebanon and 
Eritrea, the steps taken overlapped. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
 
This study has analysed the mine action environment and a number of 
programmes within it.  It has looked at the development of mine action over the 
last 13 years and how, although certain elements of the mine action arena have 
changed, there are still a number of areas which do not seem to have 
developed in the right direction.  The recent introduction of the International 
Mine Action Standards (IMAS) has been a significant driver for technical change 
in the industry as well as directing the quality issues within mine action.  IMAS is 
a quality based series of documents and allows the national authorities some 
flexibility in the initiation of programmes although ultimately the national 
authority of the country of implementation will have the final say in any 
programme. 
 
• The first chapter outlined the structure of the study and identified the 
aims and objectives as well as defining the methodology. 
 
• Chapter two presented a brief history and overview of the mine action 
environment and outlined how the humanitarian community has begun to 
attempt to overcome this appalling global problem that has emerged over 
the last 13 years.  The role of the UN, the key body involved in global 
mine action is explained as is the basic structure of the key agencies 
involved in mine action; UNMAS, UNDP and UNOPS. 
 
• Chapter three analyses the literature that is available, from the general 
humanitarian and developmental perspective, through to specific 
publications looking at particular countries and programmes.  The 
chapter then considers a number of previous studies that have analysed 
the management structures of mine action programmes and 





• Chapter four develops case studies of two specific countries – Cambodia 
and Mozambique – and outlines the development of the programmes 
therein and the influences that caused their development in their 
particular direction.  The chapter assesses the mine action programmes 
in the two countries and the fact that they were both initiated under very 
different circumstances and therefore shaped in significantly different 
ways, yet over the last ten years, have emerged to be shaped into 
remarkably similar national structures.  In contrast to Cambodia and 
Mozambique, addition, the chapter gives a brief history of the relatively 
recent development of the mine action environment in Lebanon, which 
was then expanded upon in chapter seven. 
 
• Chapter five considers the external influences placed upon national 
programmes and how programmes have addressed such influences.  In 
particular, the cultural difficulties between expatriate advisors and 
national staff are identified.  Several benchmarking processes for 
organisational structures are analysed, and existing mine action 
programmes considered against these models.  Finally this chapter 
assesses how planning processes vary depending on cultural 
background and the difficulties of operating in a culturally alien 
environment. 
 
• Chapter six draws on a number of structural environments that could be 
applied in the development of a national mine action programme and 
goes on to discuss the differences and difficulties inherent within the 
position along the emergency – development continuum. 
 
• Chapter seven draws together the various issues raised during the 
course of the study and looks at how some of the lessons learned in 
previous studies have been utilised in the initiation phase of a relatively 






A global model? 
 
Whilst the concept of a global model of a mine action programme may at first 
sight seem to be attractive, it has become apparent from the research 
undertaken that the development and attempted application of standard model 
would, in reality, be neither applicable, nor welcome due to the huge amount of 
external influences involved. 
 
There are however indicators that can be drawn from the stage of development 
of the country and its position along the emergency – development continuum 
that can and should be used for the more formal structuring of any future mine 
action programme. 
 
What is perhaps more positive is the development that mine action has 
undertaken in the last 13 years.  From questionable beginnings, the industry is 
developing towards becoming a quality driven environment, which offers huge 
opportunities for humanitarian relief.  Steps are being taken towards 
formalisation and standardisation.  Several examples can be given.  The 
virtually global usage of the standardised UN initiated Information Management 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) by the vast majority of mine action 
programmes throughout the world give a benchmark for the management of 
data on all aspects of landmines in a structured and consistent way. 
 
In addition, one further standardised initiative deserves mention.  In the 
formative days of mine action, there was general recognition of the fact that 
whilst at least some of the mine action advisors moving into programmes had a 
formal education and understanding of management structures, very few of the 
national staff had the benefit of such an education.  This realisation, coupled 
with a desire to improve the quality of management, and therefore incrementally 
the quality of mine action programmes, resulted in the successful preparation 




courses, starting in 2000.  Interestingly enough, when the idea was initially 
mooted in 1997, there was a great deal of scepticism in many circles, within and 
without the UN.  Since a series of courses was started, run by Cranfield 
University for UNDP, the critics have realised the benefits and the courses are 
now widely held up to be a great success.  
 
Both these two initiatives in particular have resulted in a much more 
standardised environment in the global mine action community which should 
provide a catalyst for future improvement through the sharing of experience, 




From analysis of the study thus far, it is apparent that the recommendations fall 
into three mutually complementary categories. 
 
• INTEGRATION   
• CULTURE    
• APPROPRIATENESS  
 
It is recommended that the following principle factors should be considered prior 





• Emphasis is placed on improving the liaison between the UN agencies 
involved in mine action. 
 
• Greater importance is given to the inclusion of UNDP in the early 
planning stages of new programmes where UNMAS have the lead 





• UNMAS, together with UNDP, consider closer and more formal 
integration into the UN SAS to support DPKO in rapid deployment to 
peace support operations that may require the involvement of mine 
action assets. 
 
• More consideration is given to coordinating with other humanitarian 





• From day one of the initiation of any new programme, in whatever form, 
priority is given to the integration of the mine action programme into the 
national structure.  If such a structure does not exist, the programme 
should be designed such that it will be possible to easily integrate into a 
national structure if and when this commences. 
 
• Selection criterion for expatriate advisors are expanded to consider 
greater cultural awareness, ability and willingness to adapt to a local 
culture. 
 
• Military advisors in UN PKO are given clearer guidance on appropriate 





• Better selection of expatriate technical advisors should be considered as 
a priority, based on their organisational, developmental and management  
skills rather than their technical background. 
 






• Greater notice is taken of where the country to be operated in is situated 
on the emergency – development continuum. 
 
• Greater involvement is given to the consideration of longer-term 
development planning even during the emergency stage – with emphasis 
on increasing the input from UNDP where applicable. 
 
Further areas for study 
 
• There is a need for a detailed study to be carried out to assess more 
accurately how the various influences bearing on a mine action 
programme impact upon the best means of structuring that programme.  
Placing the country upon the emergency – development continuum may 
be a significant step forward but a clear understanding of how the 
multiple other influences bear on this process would be valuable. 
 
• A study to consider the best strategy for expatriates operating closely 
with national staff in diverse cultures would be worth considering in an 
attempt to ease the difficulties that appear to be prevalent in many 
countries. 
 
•  A detailed study of the interaction of all the UN agencies involved in 
mine action, in particular the key agencies of UNMAS, UNDP and 
UNOPS, would be of benefit in continuing to develop the slowly 
improving relationships between the agencies. 
 
• Further study is merited in the area of governmental control and 
implementation of mine action centres and also the transfer of UN 





• There is a need for a detailed analysis of how technical advisors transfer 
their skills across to their national counterparts.  There is currently little 
rigour applied to the training and skills transfer that expatriate advisors 
offer to national staff and if it is successful, it is often by luck rather than 
judgement.  A vague work plan may not be the most effective way to 




The world of humanitarian mine action has undergone a sea change since the 
first operations were undertaken in Afghanistan in 1989.  Beginning with a 
group of people who were keen to help, but had no concept as to the scale or 
humanitarian and developmental impact of the problem, the industry has 
transformed itself into a quality driven, standards based professional 
humanitarian industry which has resulted in a great improvement in the quality 
of life for many hundreds of thousands of people living in mine affected 
countries.  From a small group of people working from a makeshift office, 
though to current organisations with thousands of employees, turning over tens 
of millions of dollars per year, professionalisation has been the focus of 
development for the industry. 
 
Whilst this professionalism can only be applauded, during the early 
development of the industry, operational issues and humanitarian concerns 
tended to be the major focus, often overriding good management practices.  
This is understandable, yet good management practices will bolster the 
effectiveness of programmes and can only benefit the industry in the long term.  
This study considers a key part of the whole implementation process and 
identifies a number of areas requiring further study.  It recognises that there can 
be no boilerplate solution for implementation of a programme, yet identifies that 
there is benefit in gaining a more detailed understanding of what is required to 





If the mine action industry can evolve as rapidly and successfully over the next 
13 years as it has over the past 13, the impact of landmines may be 
ameliorated with more cost effective solutions and effective programmes, 
together with the development of a national management capacity to assist the 
development of those nations less fortunate than our own. 
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Country mine action 




















































Afghanistan ○ ● ○   
Albania  ○ ●   
Angola ○ ●    
Azerbaijan  ○ ●   
Bosnia-Herzegovina   ● ○  
Cambodia   ○ ●  
Chad  ○ ● ○  
Colombia   ○ ●  
Croatia   ○ ● ○ 
Egypt    ○ ● 
Ethiopia  ○ ● ○  
Guatemala   ○ ●  
Guinea-Bissau   ○   
Iraq  ○ ●   
Jordan    ○ ● 
Kosovo  ○ ●   
Laos   ○ ●  
Lebanon  ● ○   
Mozambique   ○ ●  
Nicaragua    ●  
Panama    ●  
Sierra Leone ○ ●    
Somalia ○ ●    
Sri Lanka ○ ○ ○ ●  
Sudan ○ ● ○   
Thailand    ●  




● primary state of mine action in each country programme 
○ other states of mine action recognisable in each country programme 
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Roles and Responsibilities of UN Agencies in Mine Action 
 
 
The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) {KEY AGENCY} 
UNMAS is the focal point for all mine-related activities. It is responsible for 
ensuring a coordinated response to landmine contamination, establishing 
priorities for assessment missions and coordinating the mobilisation of 
resources.  It is also responsible for the preparation and maintenance of 
technical standards, the collection and maintenance of mine related data, 
advocacy in support of a global ban on mines and for the management of the 
Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) which is the central fund to which donors channel 
their funds through the UN system for mine action.  
 
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) {KEY AGENCY} 
UNDP is the focus for the establishment of national and local capacity and 
addressing the socio-economic consequences of mine contamination.  UNDP 
will normally have the prime responsibility for the development of integrated, 
sustainable mine action programmes where programmes have passed the 
“emergency” stage. 
 
The UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) {KEY AGENCY} 
UNOPS is a service provider for integrated mine action and capacity building 
programmes.  It implements programmes as appropriate in conjunction with the 
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concerned partners (such as UNMAS, UNDP etc,).  UNOPS is the Agency 
responsible for recruitment of international staff of programmes.  In addition, 
UNOPS coordinate and manage a programme in Northern Iraq paid for by the 
“Food for Oil” agreement between the UN and the Iraqi Government with a 
budget of £45 million between 1997 and 2000. 
 
The UN Children’s fund (UNICEF) 
UNICEF is the focal point for Mines Risk Education (MRE), one of the “five 
pillars” of mine action. 
 
Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA)  
DDA are responsible for disarmament issues and focal point for the Ottawa 
treaty implementation. 
 
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 
UNOCHA works to consider the humanitarian implications of the landmine 
problem, which feeds into policy planning processes. 
 
World Health Organisation (WHO) 
WHO advises on public health consequences of landmines. 
 
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
UNHCR are responsible for refugee/Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) safety in 
mine affected countries. 
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World Food Programme (WFP) 
WFP offer food assistance and agricultural development and provide useful 
mechanisms for coordination in mine affected areas. 
 
World Bank 
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Summary of recommendations from UN DHA multi-country 
study 1997 
 
Measurement of the Socio-Economic Impact of Mines. 
1. A more structured approach should be taken by the United Nations and its 
partners to document and analyse the impact of mines on civilian life and the 
way in which social and economic activity is hindered or rendered impossible as 
a result of mine warfare.  Resources should be made available to improve data 
collection and analysis on the socio-economic impact of mines.    
 
2. The UN, in collaboration with all concerned parties, should mobilize 
resources for the development of a simplified methodology to measure the 
impact of mines on poverty and on the coping mechanisms of affected 
communities. 
 
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
3. As a supporter of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the UN focal 
point for landmines should monitor ongoing conflicts, to the extent that this is 
appropriate and feasible, and use its position to influence all concerned parties 
to cease the use of mine warfare.  This should include action to identify 
suppliers of such weapons.  
 
4. Directors of all UN-supported mine action programmes should ensure that all 
their staff are fully familiar with the Secretary-General’s position on landmines 
and should not, in their official duties, advocate against the ICBL.  
 
5. The UN should explore all available opportunities to work with mine-affected 
countries to develop legal frameworks inhibiting the stockpiling and use of 
landmines. 
 
UN Support for Mine Action Programmes  
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6. The mandate of the United Nations focal point for landmines should be 
affirmed and supported by all concerned entities of the United Nations system.  
Such a mandate includes advocacy for a total ban on the use, manufacture, 
trade, and stockpiling of landmines and on behalf of landmine survivors. This 
mandate should also include responsibility for analysing the use and impact of 
landmines and helping ensure that peace negotiations address the issue of 
landmines.  
 
7. The UN focal point for landmines should develop specific mechanisms to 
ensure that an appropriate exchange of information and cross-fertilization occur 
between programmes.  Activities already undertaken in this connection, such as 
the Landmines Newsletter and Global Database, should be strengthened and 
expanded.   
 
8. In terms of helping affected countries address the immediate and long-term 
consequences of landmines, the UN should take a proactive role in needs 
assessment, planning and, when necessary, the creation of Mine Action 
Centres.  This should include assistance with resource mobilization and the 
development of skills needed to ensure continuity and sustainability.  Support 
should be provided in a manner which will allow for a seamless transition 
between the initiation and consolidation phases. The UN focal point should take 
an active role in ongoing development and promotion of operational and safety 
standards.  It should monitor the application of new technologies and should 
facilitate an exchange of expertise between programmes.   
 
9. Given the difficulties inherent in the application of UN rules and regulations in 
crisis situations the UN focal point should not get directly involved in the 
implementation of field activities.  It should contract out specific tasks and 
projects to UN bodies not bound by UN Secretariat Rules and Regulations, to 
national and international NGOs, or to commercial firms.  DPKO, UNOPS and 
UNDP collaboration in the organization of contractual arrangements should be 
periodically reviewed and steps taken to maximize effectiveness. 
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Delineation of Responsibility Between Humanitarian and Operational Mine 
Action Activities 
10. Given inherent time constraints and the difficulties which have been 
encountered in trying to ensure that activities launched to meet operational 
mission objectives form the basis for an indigenous long-term capacity, there 
should be a delineation of responsibility, authority and budgetary resources for 
all activities related to “humanitarian” and “operational” mine action initiatives.  
This in effect means that “operational” mine action activities such as the 
clearance of major routes or other areas needed to facilitate the deployment 
and movement of mission personnel will be undertaken under the direct 
authority of the Force Commander utilizing mission resources.  All “operational” 
mine action activities should, however, be undertaken in close consultation with 
the Mine Action Centre or coordination mechanism established for the purpose 
of organizing a national programme to ensure that all UN activities are mutually 
supportive.  In this connection, the UN focal point should ensure that all Force 
Commanders and their staff are fully briefed on the different requirements of 




11. The United Nations should facilitate the creation of a national mine action 
authority with an appropriate mandate and composition.  The purpose of a 
national authority is to ensure that mine action activities have an appropriate 
governance body.  In general, the authority’s mandate will include overall 
responsibility for broad policy guidance, selection of the Executive Director of 
the Mine Action Centre and appointment of external auditors.  It should also 
ensure that periodic independent evaluations are undertaken.  The mine action 
authority would normally ensure that a portion of the national budget is made 
available annually for the country’s mine action activities.  The authority should 
ensure that mine action policy is non-partisan and is in accord with 
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humanitarian considerations including the allocation of resources to address the 
mine-related problems of those who are most vulnerable. 
The Mine Action Centre 
12. The UN focal point should take a proactive role in the creation of a Mine 
Action Centre.  The core function of such a Centre is to ensure that programme 
activities give effect to established policy.  This necessarily involves the 
development of an overall plan and ensuring that a coherent and 
comprehensive approach is pursued in a safe and cost-effective manner.  In 
line with its central coordination responsibilities, the MAC will generally be 
responsible for planning, for a central data bank on minefield information, for 
resource mobilization, for monitoring, and overall programme development 
including the investigation of accidents and follow up activities.  It should also 
act as the country’s regulatory agency.  
 
Operational Modalities 
13. The study team strongly recommends in favour of distinct 
coordination and implementation arrangements.  Operational activities 
should be undertaken by independently managed mine action agencies 
(such as national and international NGOs) under contract to the MAC.  
The MAC should not become directly involved in implementation 
activities but retain overall control through sound contractual 
arrangements. This approach puts less strain on human resources at the 
centre in terms of management and control capabilities.  It is more 
transparent for donors and more responsive to shifting priorities and 
demand as the mine problem is brought under control and the level of 
activities decrease over the years.  There are situations, however, where 
the vertical integration approach will be the option preferred by the 
national authorities.   If the mine action authority and the MAC determine 
to directly execute operations in the field then the central management 
structure must be considerably enlarged to provide management and 
logistical support to units in the field.  
D-4 




Early Collection of Data 
14. In many situations of protracted or sporadic conflict, or where parts of a 
country are stabilized, information, for example on population displacement due 
to mines, is one indicator of the need for future mine action activities.  The UN 
should take a more proactive approach in collecting and analyzing available 
information on the presence of landmines in situations likely to harm civilians. 
 
Multi-Disciplinary Assessment 
15. The UN focal point should systematically undertake a multi-disciplinary 
assessment mission prior to the initiation of programme planning as has 
increasingly been the case in recent years.  Assessments should be undertaken 
in consultation with all relevant in-country parties to determine the nature and 
general scope of the problem including its socio-economic implications, the 
resources available at the local and national level which can be drawn upon to 
reduce vulnerability, and the factors which are likely to affect the launching of 
the programme. 
 
Clause on Landmines in Peace Agreements 
16. The UN focal point should take a proactive approach and promote the 
inclusion of an appropriate clause on landmines in peace agreements.  Such a 
clause would, for example, stipulate that parties to the conflict must desist from 
using mines, that they undertake to make available information on minefield and 
patterns of mine use, and facilitate in every way possible humanitarian mine 
action activities. 
 
Use of Voluntary and Assessed Contributions 
17. The Mine Action Centre and operational activities should be funded by the 
government and voluntary contributions.  Assessed budget funds from peace-
keeping missions should be utilized solely for “operational demining” under the 
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control of the peace-keeping forces until such time as the UN reforms its 
accounting and accountability procedures.  
 
Tripartite Agreements 
18. Donor nations that choose to fund NGOs and commercial entities 
directly should do so through a tripartite agreement involving the donor, 
the implementing agency, and the Mine Action Centre.  This will facilitate 
coordination and ensure adherence to standards.  
 
Financial Tracking 
19. Given the importance of a better understanding of expenditure on 
mine action programmes, the UN focal point should work with donors 
and country programmes to develop a simple and reliable system of 
financial tracking.  
 
Financial and Administration 
20. Mine action is too important to be held hostage to procurement and 
recruitment delays dictated by out-dated and inappropriate rules and 
regulations.  Mine Action Centres need maximum authority delegated to 
the field, particularly in the Planning and Initiation phases.  In 
consultation with the relevant authorities, expedited field procedures 
must be introduced by the UN.   If it is unable to do so, the UN should 
acknowledge its ineffectiveness and find another institutional home for 
the development of mine action activities. During the critical early 
phases, before donors have confidence in newly formed Mine Action 
Centres, the UN must find ways to mobilize funds and establish a project 
document and budget.  The UN must appoint a Programme Manager 
with delegated authority to procure and recruit within the project 
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document and its budget.  Qualified Admin and Finance staff should be 
available from the very beginning of MAC activities.  
 
Quality Control, Monitoring, Evaluations  
21. The Mine Action Centre should establish a quality control unit to continually 
assess staff performance in the field to ensure that field activities are 
undertaken in line with the highest standards appropriate to humanitarian mine 
action.  Remedial training should take place when problems are identified.  
 
22. The Mine Action Centre should regularly conduct monitoring missions to the 
field composed of MAC staff, donor representatives, and relevant UN agencies 
and other concerned actors as appropriate.   The reports of these missions 
should be forwarded directly to the Director of the MAC.  
 
23. The mine action authority, in consultation with major donors, should 
regularly contract a competent outside agency to conduct a thorough evaluation 
of all aspects of the mine action programme including financial, management 
and operational activities.  This evaluation should take place roughly every two 
years and should include a team member identified by the UN focal point to 
facilitate continuity and exchange of information between programmes.  
 
Programme Profile 
24. The profile and range of field operational activities should be the result of a 
multi-disciplinary assessment of the minefield threat and should be based on a 
thorough review of available resources including different technologies and 
capabilities which are available in-country or elsewhere.   
 
25. The Programme Manager of the MAC should pursue a needs-driven and 
proactive response in the orchestration of field operational activities.  This 
means that whether the MAC is directly responsible for the development and 
implementation of field activities, or whether operational activities are carried 
out under contract to the MAC, resources must be allocated in a manner which 
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ensures priorities are met and demining teams are not sitting idle because 
communication and logistics infrastructure are not yet available. 
 
Mine Awareness 
26. All programme planners and managers should take a proactive approach to 
mine awareness and ensure that it is an integral component of a 
comprehensive mine action programme.  All mine awareness activities should 
be coordinated with UNICEF and the MAC.   
 
Prioritisation 
27. Programme Managers of Mine Action Centres should develop and 
establish processes to enable prioritisation of minefield clearance and 
survey tasks.  Prioritisation should be developed with the advice and 
expertise of personnel familiar with rural development and social issues 
in affected communities.  
 
Training 
28. Training programmes should be designed as inherent components of 
building an indigenous capacity.  Greater attention must be given to the 
development of administrative and management skills as well as to 
specializations such as surveying and data management.  Whenever expatriate 
personnel are used in training and advisory functions, national counterparts 
should be available and given maximum on-the-job training.   
 
29. Programme planning should ensure that training timetables are in synch 
with operational objectives.    
 
30. The Mine Action Centre should take a proactive role in (a) coordinating the 
organization of training facilities for all in-country teams as appropriate and (b) 
in the development of a standardized training curricula; it should monitor all 
training initiatives with a view to ensuring that all graduates meet basic 
D-8 
Annex D to MSc Dissertation 
 
minimum standards.   
 
31. The MAC should take a proactive role in ensuring that expatriate Technical 
Advisers have appropriate qualifications and skills needed for the task of 
training and transfer of knowledge.  Similarly, an effort must be made to avoid 
the rapid turnover of personnel involved in training activities.  All such personnel 
should be available for a minimum of 12 months and, preferably, for 24 months.  
 
Standard Operating Procedures 
32. Agreed Standard Operating Procedures must form the methodological basis 
for the conduct of mine action activities.  Mine Action Centres should ensure 
that all agencies operate according to accepted SOPs.  SOPs used in 
humanitarian mine action activities must reflect the humanitarian nature of the 
intervention and will differ significantly from SOPs developed for military or 
commercial mine and UXO clearance.  Endorsement of approved SOPs and 
enforcement of these must be seen as a basic coordination and regulatory 
function of the Mine Action Centre. 
 
Operational Safety 
33. All accidents occurring during minefield mapping, marking and clearance or 
in areas declared free of mines must be fully investigated.  The MAC should 
compile and circulate the results of accident investigations and ensure that all 
operators and commercial agencies circulate information concerning 
accidents.     
 
34. The MAC should establish a Board of Enquiry to oversee the investigation 
of all accidents.  The Board should, in terms of its membership, draw together 
appropriate personnel so that objective investigations are undertaken if and 
when the MAC itself sustains accidents.    
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35. The issue of protective clothing should be further examined and 
modifications, as appropriate, reflected in the international standards set out in 
the document “International Standards for Mine Clearance Operations”.  
 
Remuneration Levels 
36. Programme Managers should carefully consider salary levels both in terms 
of sustainability and the appropriateness of the expertise being provided.  The 
Mine Action Centre should set standard conditions of employment for all 
organizations operating within the country programme. 
 
Productivity, Research and Development 
37. The UN should take a more proactive role in helping Mine Action Centres 
collect, analyse and document empirical data on the productivity levels of 
different methodologies in different conditions.  This should be seen as an 
important planning and evaluation tool.  The UN should also take a proactive 
role in developing indicators and criteria useful for measuring overall 
productivity levels.    
 
38. The UN should facilitate information sharing as a routine task between 
programmes and relevant actors and help ensure an effective dialogue between 
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